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ABSTRACT 
 
In Part 1, I address why insurers, whom traditionally invest in relatively safe assets, choose to 
invest in private equity (PE). Using insurer financial disclosures, I test theories relating how risk-
shifting, managerial discretion, underinvestment, asset-liability matching, regulation, home bias, 
and reaching-for-yield affect PE investment. Results indicate risk-shifting and managerial 
discretion by stock insurers does not factor into the PE investment decision. In addition, results 
confirm home bias positively influences PE investment while underinvestment, asset-liability 
matching, and regulation deter PE investment. Finally, insurers have not increased their PE 
allocation due to low-yield interest rate environments. In Part 2, I directly test the economies of 
scope hypothesis of Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
methodology of Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013). I find private firms with less than $50 million in 
sales are more likely to be acquired than to offer an IPO when their industry has high economies 
of scope. I do not find evidence that 3-year buy-and-hold returns for IPOs are associated with 
economies of scope levels. I also find economies of scope are negatively related to firms 
adopting a dual tracking strategy, but does not explain sell-out premiums for acquired private 
firms. Lastly, in Part 3, I examine whether private IPOs (PIPOs) decrease information 
asymmetry in firms that eventually engage in an IPO. Theoretically, PIPOs can mitigate 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard because private investments can signal 
undervaluation and potentially provide more effective monitoring. Consequently, firms with 
larger, more recent, and frequent PIPOs should experience less underpricing and post-IPO 
volatility relative to other IPOs due to increased monitoring, lower signal attenuation, and 
positive feedback with existing investor buy-ins, respectively. Results indicate the percentage of 
PIPO investment compared to total equity at IPO is negatively associated with underpricing, thus 
suggesting PIPOs decrease information asymmetry. However, the longer the amount of time 
between the last PIPO and the IPO and the total number of PIPOs are positively related to 
underpricing. 
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PART 1: THE DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE EQUITY HOLDINGS: EVIDENCE FROM 
THE U.S. INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
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PART 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The trend of private equity (PE) firms entering into the U.S. insurance marketplace has led 
to controversy. Over the course of 2015, PE backed insurers accounted for 242 of the total of 451 
U.S. and Canadian acquisitions within the industry (OPTIS Partners 2016). This activity has 
captured the attention of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The NAIC 
fear the traditionally higher risk tolerance of PE firms may eventually conflict with paying 
guaranteed liabilities. Undoubtedly, they have substantiated concerns. Historically, PE firms focus 
on high-risk investments to earn high-yield returns for themselves, the general partners, and their 
investors, the limited partners. Interestingly, insurers play a vital role as limited partners. Insurers 
hold approximately $189 billion, or 10%, of the total PE under management (Preqin 2015). This 
fact is at odds with the traditional view of insurers as acquirers of relatively safe assets. Why do 
insurers invest in a risk asset such as PE? Our study addresses this question.  
  Using a sample of 8,321 insurers over the 2006-2013 period, we are able to test investment 
choice theory and identify the determining factors for PE holdings. Our results indicate a number 
of important findings. While stock insurers have exhibited greater managerial discretion and risk-
shifting than mutual insurers; they are actually 20.6% less likely to invest in PE. Additionally, the 
underinvestment problem deters highly levered insurers from investing in PE. Insurers with higher 
leverage are 7.4% less likely to invest in PE relatively to lower leveraged insurers. Among insurers 
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who do choose to invest in PE, leverage is negatively related to the percentage of PE investment. 
We also find strict levels of regulation deter PE investment. Using New York as our proxy for 
stringent regulation, we find insurers with higher levels of premiums written within New York are 
3.2% less likely to invest relative to other insurers. In terms of asset-liability matching, we find 
little evidence suggesting insurers factor this into their PE investment decision. Rather we find 
statistical evidence showing a negative relation between long tail lines and PE investment. 
 We also identify factors that increase the likelihood of PE investment. We find insurers are 
susceptible to home bias investment with respect to PE. Insurers located within close proximity to 
major PE markets are 9.5% more likely to invest in PE. We also note that insurer size is the most 
important economic determinant for both the decision to invest in PE. Furthermore, our analysis 
indicates insurers who invest in PE do not follow a finite risk paradigm. According to the finite 
risk paradigm, insurers who assume more risk in a portfolio area should assume less risk in another 
area. However, our results indicate historically risk assets (i.e. junk bonds) are positively related 
to PE investment while cash is negatively related to PE investment.   
  Lastly, we investigate whether insurers “reach for yield” by either increasing risk within 
the PE asset class or by substituting less risky assets with PE. Due to the low interest rate 
environment, insurers have incentives to explore both strategies. Becker and Ivashina (2015) find 
evidence indicating insurers reach-for-yield in the corporate bond market. Furthermore, insurers 
who did reach for yield experienced larger equity losses during the latest financ ial crisis. Therefore, 
reaching-for-yield can be particularly problematic because an increased concentration of 
systematic risk in insurers’ portfolios can have a negative impact on the broader economy. This 
study finds mixed results for insurers reaching-for-yield with PE. Risk within PE investments 
appears constant over the sample period, but both the percentage of insurers who invest and PE 
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portfolio allocations increase. However, the increase in PE is not at the expense of safer assets 
such as U.S. government bonds. Finally, in a multivariate setting, our results indicate the 
2006-2013 period is associated with a 7.7% decrease in the likelihood of PE investment among 
the top quartile of insurers and is negatively related to the percentage of PE allocation.  
 The remainder of our study proceeds as follows. Section II provides an overview of PE 
investments. Section III develops the hypotheses. Section IV outlines the methods used in studying 
the determinants of PE investment and describes the NAIC dataset. Section V presents the results. 
Section VI summarizes the findings and concludes.  
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OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE EQUITY 
Private equity (PE) is an alternative asset class consisting of equity investments that are 
not freely tradable in a public market. Typically, PE provides capital to private companies for 
expansion, product development, or restructuring. Regardless of the strategy, the investment 
process generally follows the same cycle. Figure I outlines the relationships among general 
partners, LPs and portfolio companies for a generalized PE fund. Initially, the general partners, a 
group of professional managers, solicit capital for a fund. Institutions such as endowments, 
pensions, insurers, and banks act as the LPs and provide the bulk of capital required for these 
funds. Once the fundraising is complete, general partners make a series of investments directly 
into various private companies forming a portfolio for the fund. Afterwards, general partners 
actively manage this portfolio by providing guidance and, therefore, enhance the value of the 
portfolio companies. Unlike the general partners, LPs do not have direct involvement with the 
companies in order to maintain their limited liability status. A fund typically has a life of ten years, 
but can be extended up to an additional three years in some cases. Towards the end of a fund’s life, 
general partners liquidate their positions, using a variety of exit strategies, and distribute proceeds 
between themselves and LPs. Furthermore, it is common that well respected general partners will 
develop new funds every few years with prior LPs usually get first access over new investors. See 
Figure II for the complete PE cycle.  
[Insert Figure I] 
[Insert Figure II] 
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 For the purpose of our study, we examine the following types of private equity investments : 
venture capital, leveraged buyouts, growth capital, mezzanine, distressed debt, and fund of funds1. 
These investment categories are defined as follows. Venture capital (VC) consists of investments 
made in an early-stage company for equity stakes that are commonly sold through either an IPO 
or trade sale. Leveraged buyouts (LBO) consist of investments where either the company itself or 
its assets are taken private through the use of debt. Growth capital refers to situations where 
minority equity stakes are bought from mature privately ran companies. Mezzanine is the use of 
subordinated debt and/or preferred equity stakes. Typically, companies that offer mezzanine 
financing have taken on too much debt for creditors to continue extending credit, yet are hesitant 
to dilute existing equity stakes. Distressed debt consists of the use of either equity or debt 
instruments in companies on the brink restructuring. Lastly, fund of funds refers to situations where 
a PE fund is dedicated solely to investment into other PE funds.  
 The literature observing the interaction between PE and the insurance industry has recently 
developed. Braun, Schmeiser, and Siegel (2014) investigate the attractiveness of PE among life 
insurers from both regulatory capital and performance viewpoints. They provide evidence that PE 
is over-penalized from a regulatory capital perspective by standard approaches, Solvency II and 
the Swiss Solvency Test, for a representative life insurer. In the case of Solvency II, the standard 
formula uses a crude stress factor for “other equities” when calculating PE capital charges. This is 
problematic because the “other equities” stress factor is used for PE, hedge funds, commodit ies, 
and emerging market equities regardless of the fact these classes have a high degree of 
heterogeneity in return distributions. Braun et al. argue using a specific stress factor for each asset 
                                                                 
1 Although there are self-identified equity investments in real estate, we exclude these since real estate is contested as 
belonging to the PE asset class .     
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is more appropriate and consequently would decrease capital charges for PE.  
 Other studies such as Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007) and Da Rin and Phalippou 
(2014) investigate the heterogeneity of returns among different LP types, which include insurers. 
Lerner et al. observe returns differ drastically across LP types with endowments earning annual 
returns approximately 21% greater than the average LP while insurers underperform 3.5% from 
the average. They propose the heterogeneity of returns occurs because LP types differ in their 
sophistication and investment objectives. Da Rin and Phalippou find larger LPs receive more 
favorable contractual terms, pay less fees, and employ more specialized screening and monitor ing 
of PE contracts than the smaller LPs. This study differs from those previously mentioned because 
it investigates the factors that influence a specific LP type’s decision to invest, not return 
differences. 
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HYPOTHESES 
 The purpose of this study is to identify what factors influence a LP’s decision to invest in 
PE and the extent of their investment. Therefore, we develop the following hypotheses and how 
they relate to PE investment decisions.  
 
Agency Issues 
 PE investment can potentially lead to risk shifting by the firm’s managers. Due to limited 
liability, managers, working in the interest of owners, have an incentive to substitute a riskier asset 
for a less risky asset. In the insurance setting, stock insurer owners can potentially invest in a riskier 
asset such as PE at the expense of policyholders. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) document this 
risk shifting behavior in the insurance context. They observe stock insurers participate in risk 
shifting by increasing their stock holdings while decreasing their bond holdings around the date of 
guaranty-fund enactments. However, they do not find evidence suggesting mutual insurers engage 
in this behavior.  
 Additionally, the mutual insurer organizational format may actually limit PE investment. 
Mayers and Smith (1981, 1994) argue stock insurers should hold a comparative advantage in 
activities that involve managerial discretion. The separation of managerial and ownership 
functions provides stock insurers with liquidity and risk-bearing efficiencies that mutual insurers 
cannot match due to the higher cost of controlling management. Fama and Jensen (1983) outline 
that investments requiring greater managerial discretion are characterize as more costly to trade, 
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generate more uncertain cash flows, and are more difficult to value. PE fits all three of these 
criteria. PE is highly illiquid (due to the long holding periods required), has a wide variance in 
cash flows to LPs, and difficult to value (lack of market trading). Taken together, a greater amount 
of managerial discretion may be required to evaluate the relative complexity of PE investment 
compared to traditional asset classes (i.e. bonds). This is at odds with mutual insurers requiring 
assets with easily determined values in order to fulfill redemptions of residual claims (Fama and 
Jensen). Therefore, stock insurers may have a comparative advantage over mutual insurers when 
investing in PE.   
Hypothesis 1a: Stock insurers are more likely to invest in PE than mutual insurers, ceteris 
paribus. 
Hypothesis 1b: Stock insurers invest a higher percentage of their portfolio in PE than 
mutual insurers, ceteris paribus. 
 
Underinvestment 
 Underinvestment occurs when shareholders pass up positive net present value projects 
because the fixed claimants receive higher disproportional benefits relative to shareholders 
(Myers, 1977). Firms can reduce the variance of their value by reducing investment portfolio risk 
and therefore strengthen their ability to repay fixed claimants and decrease potential 
underinvestment costs. Subsequently, investment portfolio risk should be less for firms that are 
highly levered. Mayers and Smith (1987) and Colquitt and Cox (1999) document an inverse 
relation between leverage and risky investment behavior among insurers. Consequently, as 
financial leverage increases, insurers should be less inclined to invest in PE due to the costs of 
underinvestment.  
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Hypothesis 2a: Insurers with higher leverage are less likely to invest in PE than insurers 
with less leverage, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2b: Insurers with higher leverage will invest a lower percentage of their 
portfolio in PE than insurers with less leverage, ceteris paribus. 
 
Asset Maturity Structure 
 Mayers and Smith (1981) suggest insurers specializing in selling long-lived fixed liability 
claims, like life insurance, should be more likely to hold investments such as privately placed loans 
for two reasons. First, these claims are paid out after long periods and the investment in privately 
placed loans should match the lower liquidity needs of these policies. Second, since there is no 
readily available secondary market, the cost of changing the characteristics of the firm’s cash flow 
distribution after the policy’s sale is increased. The same reasoning for holding privately placed 
loans is applicable for PE. PE investments require long durations (the average PE fund has a 
ten-year duration) and there is not a viable secondary market for PE. Following this reasoning, 
insurers who write relatively more long-tail policies than short-tail policies are expected to have 
higher proportions of PE holdings for both asset-liability matching and liquidity reasons2. 
However, there is evidence suggesting life insurers today may not face the same duration needs as 
compared to prior decades. Doffou (2005) points out that the volatility in U.S. interest rates has 
shortened the duration of liabilities among U.S. life insurers. Consequently, if true then the 
decrease in duration should increase liquidity needs, which is not favorable for PE investment.  
                                                                 
2 Long-tail  l ines include Ocean Marine, Medical Professional Liability, International, Reinsurance, Workers’ 
Compensation, Other Liability, Product Liability, Aircraft, Boiler and Machinery, Farmowners Multiple Peril, 
Homeowners Multiple Peril, Commercial Multiple Peril, and Automobile Liability. (Phillips, Cummins, and Allen, 
1998) 
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Hypothesis 3a: Insurers with a higher percentage of net premiums written in long-tail lines 
are more likely to invest in PE than insurers with a lower percentage in long-tail lines, 
ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 3b: Insurers with a higher percentage of net premiums written in long-tail lines 
invest a higher percentage of their portfolio in PE than insurers with a lower percentage 
in long-tail lines, ceteris paribus. 
 
Regulation 
 An insurer’s regulatory environment could potentially limit risky investments. Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) contend regulation provides monitoring and discipline for regulated firm’s 
management (e.g. regulators can apply pressure to replace a bank’s management if the balance 
sheet appears overly risky). Smith (1986) argues regulation limits managerial discretion in 
investment decisions. Consequently, if PE requires greater managerial discretion then regulat ion 
can limit insurer investment. Following both assertions, we believe regulation will have a negative 
relation to PE. We use the state of New York as our stringent regulation proxy because New York 
insurance regulation mandates extraterritorial requirements and is considered the strictest state 
within the U.S. Therefore, we propose:    
Hypothesis 4a: Insurers with a higher percentage of net premiums written in New York are 
less likely to invest in PE than insurers with a lower percentage in New York , ceteris 
paribus. 
Hypothesis 4b: Insurers with a higher percentage of net premiums written in New York 
invest a lower percentage of their portfolio in PE than insurers with a lower percentage in 
New York, ceteris paribus. 
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Home Bias 
 Home bias occurs when investors favor investment opportunities within close proximity 
rather than distant ones. Studies have demonstrated this behavioral bias in both individual and 
institutional investors3. Hochberg and Rauh (2012) study this theory specifically for another class 
of LPs, public pension funds, and find they are more likely to overweigh their investment portfolio 
in local PE funds. Local investment could indicate local insurers have lower asymmetr ic 
information costs than insurers located further away. Consequently, we expect insurers close to 
major PE markets (e.g., New York and Boston for leveraged buyouts and Palo Alto for venture 
capital) are more likely to invest in PE due to lower information asymmetry costs.  
Hypothesis 5: Insurers located closer to major PE markets are more likely to invest in PE 
than insurers who are not, ceteris paribus. 
 
Reaching-for-Yield 
 Reaching-for-yield may be a potential motivator for insurers to invest in PE. The low 
interest rate environment following the 2008 financial crisis has left insurers seeking higher 
yields to pay off guaranteed liabilities. Becker and Ivashina (2014) find insurers invest in the 
corporate bond market because of higher yield spreads. Furthermore, A.M. Best (2014) reports 
insurers are increasing their overall allocation to Schedule BA - of which PE is a major 
component. The report reiterates insurers’ desire to achieve higher yield in a low yield 
environment. Therefore, insurers may have increased their PE investments following the 2008 
financial crisis in order to achieve higher yields.  
                                                                 
3 See French and Poterba (1991), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005), Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Chan, Covrig, and 
Ng (2005), and Hau and Rey (2008). 
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Hypothesis 6a: Insurers are more likely to invest in PE during the sample period due to 
the low interest rate environment, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 6b: Insurers invest a higher percentage in PE of their investment portfolio 
during the sample period due to the low interest rate environment, ceteris paribus. 
 
  
 14 
 
 
 
 
METHODS AND DATA 
Since much of the sample does not invest in PE, there is a large distribution of zero values 
for the dependent variables. Therefore, the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) as an estimation 
procedure on the full sample of insurers is likely to result in biased and inconsistent coeffic ient 
estimators. Consequently, we use two empirical models to determine the participation and extent 
of PE investment. The first model is a probit estimation to observe the effect of the independent 
variables on the likelihood of PE investment and is as follows:  
𝐷𝑜𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑌𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑅𝐵𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝐽𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽12𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽13 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽14𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐺𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
In this model, the dependent variable, DoInvesti, holds a binary of 1 if the insurer has PE 
investments and 0 otherwise. MUTUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurer has a mutual 
organizational form and 0 if it has a stock organizational form. LEVERAGE is the natural log of 
total liabilities to the sum of surplus, common stock, and preferred stock as seen in Colquitt and 
Hoyt (1997). LTPCT is the percentage of net premiums written in long-tail lines to total net 
premiums written. NYPCT is the percentage of net premiums written in the state of New York 
relative to total net premiums written in all states. We follow Tian (2011) and define LOCAL as a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurer is within 100 miles of New York City, Boston, or Palo 
Alto and 0 otherwise4. TREND is the aggregate amount of total PE under management worldwide 
                                                                 
4 We use other distances such as 25, 50, and 150 miles and results remain consistent.  
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for each year. 𝜖𝑖 is the error term. In addition, we identify the following controls to isolate the 
effects of theoretically motivated variables.    
  
Size 
 Larger insurers should have two distinct advantages when investing in PE. First, both 
Pottier (2007) and Da Rin and Phalippou (2014) propose that larger insurers are more apt to hire 
an internal staff of investment analysts, which would allow specialization in specific asset classes5. 
In addition, both Dyck and Pomorski (2011) and Da Rin and Phalippou (2014) find LP’S size is 
positively related to larger returns. We expect a positive relation between an insurer’s size and PE 
investment. We follow Pottier (2007) and proxy for insurer size, SIZE, with the natural logarithm 
of total net admitted assets.   
 
Group Membership 
 In the insurance industry, some insurers operate as either standalone insurers or members 
of insurer groups. This distinction could influence risk taking behavior. Standalone insurers should 
be more averse to taking risks since they have to maintain their own stature. On the other hand, 
group members are aware if they experience a liquidity shortage they can request help from other 
group members. Therefore, group members could exhibit more risky taking behavior than 
standalone insurers. Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999) document this difference in risk 
aversion by finding insurers who have group membership hold less cash than standalone insurers. 
Following this argument, we expect group membership positively relates to PE investment. We 
use a binary variable, GROUP, equal to one for aggregated groups and zero for a standalone 
                                                                 
5 Da Rin and Phalippou’s discussions with industry practitioners reinforce this belief.  
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insurer.  
 
Financial Quality 
The financial quality of the insurer could also affect potential PE investment.  In the U.S., 
insurers are required to maintain risk-based capital (RBC) to support their operations with respect 
to their size and risk profile. Cummins, Harrington, and Klein (1995) state RBC can provide 
incentives for insurers to operate safely. Furthermore, based on statements from Preqin (2013), it 
appears insurers are concerned about higher capital charges for PE investments. Therefore, we 
predict that insurers who have large amounts of RBC will be more inclined to participate in PE 
investment while those with lower levels will be less apt because of the higher capital charge. We 
control for financial quality by using RBC, the ratio of total adjusted capital to the authorized 
control level risk-based capital.  
 
Riskiness of other Investment Choices  
 Cummins and Sommer (1996) and Baranoff and Sager (2002 and 2003) provide evidence 
supporting the finite risk paradigm among property-casualty and life-health insurers respectively. 
This theory proposes firms with greater risk in one area will compensate by reducing risk in other 
areas. Following Pottier and Sommer (1998), we also control for the overall riskiness of other 
portfolio holdings by including other asset classes, which could have an impact on an insurer’s PE 
investment decision. We include both historically risky investments of junk bonds, real estate, and 
common stock along with historically safe investments of cash and mortgages. Following the finite 
risk paradigm, we expect junk bonds, real estate, and common stock holdings to have a negative 
relation with PE investment. Likewise, we expect cash and mortgage holdings will have a positive 
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relation with PE investment. We control for these holdings with the variables JUNK, REAL 
ESTATE, COMMON, CASH, and MORTGAGE, which are defined as the percentages of junk 
bonds, real estate, common stock, cash, and mortgages respectively in total invested assets.  
 Table I presents the hypotheses along with their respected variables of interest, predicted 
signs relative to PE investment, and definitions. 
 [Insert Table I] 
The second model employs an ordinary least squares model with Heckman's two-step 
selection correction to analyze the effect of the independent variables on the extent of PE 
investment. In order to obtain proper estimates at least one variable should be dropped from the 
selection equation (Puhani 2000). Since location of the investor is likely to only influence the 
decision to invest and not the magnitude of investment, the dummy variable, LOCAL, is excluded 
from the equation. The model is as follows:  
             𝑃𝐸𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑈𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑌𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑅𝐵𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐽𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽12 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖
+ 𝛽13𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐺𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝜎𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1 
 
Where the dependent variable, PEi, is the insurer’s percentage of PE to total invested assets, 𝜆𝑖 is 
the inverse Mills ratio, and all other variables are as previously defined.   
We collect data for all U.S. life and property-casualty insurers from the NAIC database for 
the years 2006 through 2013. Since PE investment decisions are likely made at the group level, we 
aggregate affiliated members together as a single observation. In addition, we aggregate insurers 
who write both life and property-casualty insurance. We exclude insurers with non-positive total 
admitted net assets, net premiums written, equity, or cash holdings. In addition, we exclude 404 
insurers who are neither a mutual or stock insurer to remove other organizational forms that may 
confound the results. Furthermore, we apply a size screen of $7.5 million to eliminate small 
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insurers that may not have the means to access PE investments6. In order to reduce the impact of 
outliers we winsorize continuous variables annually at the 1st and 99th percentile. After applying 
these screens, the final sample consists of 8,321 firm-year observations with 1,493 unique insurers 
of which 232 invest in PE.   
Insurers who invest in PE must identify the type and strategy of these investments on 
Schedule BA. PE investments are marked as ‘1’, ‘2’ or ‘3’ for venture capital, mezzanine 
financing, or leveraged buyout respectively. Upon inspection, some insurers appear to neglect 
proper identification of their long-term assets7. Consequently, we verify the proper identificat ion 
of 102,961 long-term asset listings by hand by using each listing’s description, vendor, and 
geographical information. We only use listings if we confirm with one of the following methods: 
1) a major newswire such as Bloomberg, 2) SEC filings, or 3) the fund’s website. Furthermore, we 
remove listings that appear to be suspiciously low in value by using a cutoff value of $10,000. 
Table II reports the accuracy of PE investment reporting by insurers, per year. Approximately 13% 
of listings are misclassified as the wrong type of PE or as a hedge fund annually. In addition, nearly 
22% of listings are not classified at all. Taken together insurers only correctly identify 65% of their 
PE investments. The verification process results in a final sample of 48,139 PE investments by 
232 insurers.  
[Insert Table II] 
Table III presents summary statistics of PE investments among investors. Panel A shows 
a steady 30% increase in the number of investments between 2006 (5,023) and 2013 (6,500). 
Additionally, there is a wide range in investment amounts per fund from the cutoff of $10,000 to 
                                                                 
6 We used the size of the smallest insurer who invested in PE as our cutoff.  
7 This fact was confirmed during discussions with multiple NAIC employees. The NAIC does  not verify the validity of 
type and strategy designations. 
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$500,000,000. Panel B provides summary statistics at the investor level. The number of investors 
appears fairly constant at 150 per year. As in Panel A, there appears to be an increase in the 
amounts held by investors during the sample period. Furthermore, there is a wide dispersion in 
investment amounts among investors. Panel C reports the allocation of funds investors hold. 
While the typical investor commits to 16-22 funds on average, there is a wide range in the 
number of funds owned with some investors holding single fund whereas others hold over 200 
funds.  
[Insert Table III] 
Table IV reports summary statistics of regression analysis variables with Panels A and B 
presenting the full sample and investors respectively. On the surface, the full and investor 
samples appear to be similar with respect to stock insurer organization (0.69 vs. 0.65), 
percentage of net premiums written in long-tail lines (82.33% vs. 84.93%), and percentage of net 
premiums written in NY (7.07% vs. 6.39%). However, there appears to be marked differences 
between the samples for the other theoretically motivated variables. Investors and are more likely 
located within 100 miles of a major PE investment market (0.48 vs. 0.21) compared to the full 
sample. However, investors are more highly levered (1.31 vs. 0.54) compared to the full sample. 
Later analysis compares the means and medians of non-investors and investors to determine if 
they significantly different from each other.    
[Insert Table IV] 
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RESULTS 
Univariate Results 
 Table V compares the differences in the means and medians of variables between investors 
and non-investors. We define investors as insurers who hold PE investment for a given year, while 
non-investors are insurers who do not. First, investors are more likely to be a mutual insurer 
compared to non-investors. Interestingly, underinvestment does not appear to be an issue for 
investors as they are more levered than non-investors. This difference may indicate investors are 
actually risk seeking. We also observe a positive relation between asset-liability matching and PE 
investors. This provides initial support that insurers who write more in long-tail lines may invest 
in PE to match the payout and liquidity needs of their liabilities. Based on the difference of 
medians, investors appear to write a greater percentage of net premiums in the state of New York 
relative to non-investors. This runs counter to the monitoring and managerial discretion theories 
offered by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Smith (1986) respectively. Furthermore, 48% of the 
investors are located within 100 miles of a major PE market compared to only 17% for 
non-investors. Investors may have lower asymmetric costs than non-investors, which would 
provide a competitive advantage with PE investment.     
 Among the controls, size, group membership, and mortgage holdings are in line with their 
predicted signs. The results indicate the average investor operates with a lower RBC ratio, is less 
liquid, and holds higher percentages of junk bond and common stock holdings than the average 
non-investor. These results suggest investors may not follow a finite risk paradigm and are actually 
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risk seeking.   
[Insert Table V] 
 We now focus on the remaining theory by investigating whether insurers exhibit behavior 
indicating they are “reaching- for-yield” in the PE asset class. Reaching-for-yield can be 
problematic because an increased concentration of systematic risk in insurers’ portfolios can 
have a negative impact on the broader economy. Becker and Ivashina (2014) examine if 
reaching-for-yield was an important determinant for asset dislocations during the most recent 
financial boom using insurer investment in the corporate bond market. Unlike mutual funds and 
pension funds, insurers have capital requirements based on NAIC designation codes8. 
Consequently, this could provide an incentive for insurers to invest in riskier assets within the 
NAIC Designation Codes. Becker and Ivashina (2014) demonstrate insurers, unlike mutual funds 
and pension funds, are more inclined to invest in new corporate bonds because of higher yield 
spreads within NAIC Designation Codes. Furthermore, they find insurers who reach for yield 
prior to the 2008 crisis suffer equity losses greater than predicted by systematic risk during the 
crisis.    
 We are interested if their findings also apply to the PE asset class. They point out a 
financial institution’s incentive to search for positive α is not limited to a specific asset class. 
                                                                 
8 The NAIC 1 designation is assigned to obligations exhibiting the highest quality (AAA:A -). The NAIC 2 designation 
is assigned to obligations of high quality (BBB+:BBB-). The NAIC 3 designation is assigned to obligations of medium 
quality (BB+:BB-). The NAIC 4 designation is assigned to obligations of low quality (B+:B-). The NAIC 5 
designation is assigned to obligations of the lowest credit quality (CCC+:CCC-), which are not in or near default, 
where credit risk is at its highest and credit profile is highly volatile, but currently the issuer has the capacity to meet  
its obligations. NAIC 5* is assigned by the Securities Valuations Office (SVO) to certain obligations when an insurer 
certifies: (1) that documentation necessary to permit a full credit analysis of a security does not exist and (2) the issuer 
or obligor is current on all contracted interest and principal payments and (3) the insurer has an actual expectation of 
ultimate repayment of all contracted interest and principal. The NAIC 6 designation is assigned to obligations that are 
in or near default (CC:D). NAIC 6* is assigned by an insurer to an obligation in lieu of reporting the ob ligation with 
appropriate documentation to the SVO for a full credit analysis or filing the certification required for obtaining an 
NAIC 5* Designation. Standard and Poor’s ratings provided in parenthesis.  
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Rather the incentive is likely greater for illiquid and complex assets because their risk 
measurements are more problematic. PE displays both of these characteristics. However, unlike 
corporate bonds, the NAIC does not require insurers to provide designation codes for long-term 
assets on Schedule BA of their annual statutory filings. Nonetheless, we can still draw inferences 
based upon the investment patterns of insurers who provide NAIC designation codes.   
 Table VI presents PE investments by NAIC designation code during the sample period. 
NAIC 1 and NAIC 2 designation codes are reserved for securities with investment grades while 
NAIC 5 and NAIC 6 are for highly speculative grades (CCC and below). Upon review, insurers 
increased both NAIC 1 and NAIC 5* rated securities while simultaneously decreasing NAIC 6 
rated securities over the sample period. Furthermore, the increase in NAIC 5* rated securities is 
offset by the decrease in those rated NAIC 6. Consequently, evidence is inconsistent with 
insurers reaching for yield within the asset class during the sample period.  
[Insert Table VI] 
 While it appears risk has stayed consistent within the asset class, we examine if 
additional insurers invest in PE or substitute PE for another less risky asset. Table VII presents 
investor distribution over time. While the number of investors remains relatively stable over the 
sample period there are new entrants every year. Furthermore, the percentage of PE investors 
increases over time, but this may be due to consolidation within the insurance industry. In order 
to determine if insurers are substituting PE for safer assets we conduct an analysis on the relation 
between U.S. Government bonds and PE. Table VIII presents trends in U.S. Government bonds 
and PE allocations. While the percentage invested in PE increases by roughly 70%, it does not 
come at the expense of relatively risk free assets. Instead, investors increase their allocation to 
U.S. Government bonds following the 2008 financial crisis. These results suggest investors did 
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not engage in risk-shifting with PE.     
[Insert Table VII] 
[Insert Table VIII] 
 
Heckman Two Stage Results 
 Table IX reports the results for Heckman’s two-step estimation of investor characterist ics 
on PE investment for both the full sample and top size quartile. We investigate the top size quartile 
because there appears to be a strong relation between insurer size and PE investment.  We begin 
the analysis by reporting and interpreting the results from the first step probit regression, which 
examines the determinants of the PE investment decision. We measure economic impact for each 
variable by following Barclay and Smith (1995) and Pottier (2007). We calculate implied changes 
in the probability of investment and the percentage invested for each independent variable by 
changing the value of 1) a dummy variable from 0 to 1, 2) a continuous variable from its value at 
the 25th percentile to its value at the 75th percentile, or 3) the TREND variable from the aggregate 
amount of PE under management in 2006 to its 2013 value while holding the remaining 
independent variables at their mean values.  
 The coefficient of the agency issues variable, STOCK, is negative and significant. This 
result is inconsistent with the potential benefits of managerial discretion by stock insurers (Mayers 
and Smith 1981, 1984). Within the full sample, being a stock insurer only decreases the likelihood 
of PE investment by 1.4%. However, this relation is amplified within the top size quartile. We find 
stock insurers are 20.6% less likely to invest in PE relative to mutual insurers.   
 The coefficient of the underinvestment variable, LEVERAGE, is negative and highly 
significant. This finding supports the underinvestment hypothesis of Myers (1977) in the context 
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of insurers investing in PE. Levered insurers are less likely to invest in PE since the reduction in 
investment portfolio risk can increase their ability to repay fixed claimants and decrease potential 
underinvestment costs. This result is consistent with Colquitt and Cox (1999) whom find leverage 
is negatively related to asset portfolio risk among insurers. Changing leverage from the 25th to the 
75th percentile decreases the probability of PE investment by 0.6% and 7.4% for the full sample 
and top size quartile, respectively.  
 Surprisingly, the coefficient for the asset-liability matching variable, LTPCT, is negative ly 
related to the decision to invest in PE. This result suggests insurers do not match asset-liability 
matching needs when deciding to invest in PE. Doffou (2005) offers a possible explanation for 
this finding. He notes U.S. interest rates have experienced greater volatility over the past three 
decades, which consequently has shortened the liability durations of U.S. life insurers and 
increased their need for liquidity. The same explanation could possibly be extended to long- tail 
lines in general. Consequently, PE may not be well suited since it requires long term investment 
and is considerably illiquid.     
 The coefficient of the regulation variable, NYPCT, is negative and highly significant. This 
finding provides support for the regulation hypothesis that insurers licensed in highly regulatory 
areas are less likely to invest in PE. The decreased likelihood for PE investment may be attributed 
to regulators monitoring risk taking by management (Demsetz and Lehn 1985) and/or limit ing 
managerial discretion in investment decisions (Smith 1986). However, the economic impact for 
operating in a highly regulated area only decreases the probability of PE investment by 0.7% and 
3.2% for the full sample and top size quartile, respectively.  
 The coefficient of the home bias variable, LOCAL, is positive and highly significant , 
meaning insurers located within 100 miles of major PE markets (e.g. New York, Boston, and Palo 
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Alto) are more likely to invest in PE. This result supports the home bias hypothesis that asserts 
investors favor investment opportunities within close proximity due to lower asymmetr ic 
information costs than investments located further away. Consequently, local insurers may have a 
competitive advantage over insurers located further way due to lower asymmetric information 
costs. This finding is consistent with Hochberg and Rauh (2012) whom find another LP type, 
public pension plans, overweigh their portfolio to local PE investments. Finally, being located 
within 100 miles of a major PE market increases the likelihood of PE investment by 1.8% and 
9.5% for the full sample and top size quartile, respectively.  
 Contrary to expectations, the coefficient of the reaching-for-yield variable, TREND, is 
negatively related to the decision to invest in PE. While insurers reached for yield with new 
corporate bond issuances (Becker and Ivashina 2014), this result suggests the low interest rate 
environment following the 2008 financial crisis did not entice insurers to seek higher yields by 
investing in PE. Over the span of the sample period of 2006-2013, insurers in the top size quartile 
were 7.7% less likely to invest in PE. 
 Examining the control results provides additional insights. First, as expected, the 
coefficient of the size variable, SIZE, is positive and highly significant. This result is aligned with 
larger insurers being more capable of hiring an internal staff of investment analysts, which can 
provide investment specialization in different asset types. Additionally, the economic impact for 
SIZE is substantial. Adjusting SIZE from the 25th to the 75% percentile increases the probability 
of PE investment by 12.7% and 46.8% for the full sample and top size quartile, respectively.  
 Second, results for the riskiness of other investment choices further suggest investors do 
not follow a finite risk paradigm. In contrast to earlier predictions, but aligned with the differences 
in means/medians results, the coefficients for traditionally risky portfolio variables, (JUNK, 
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COMMON, and REAL ESTATE) are positive and highly significant while CASH is negative ly 
related to PE investment. Consequently, insurers who assume risk in other portfolio assets are 
more likely to assume additional risk portfolio risk by investing in PE.  
[Insert Table IX] 
 Table X presents the results of the second step regression including the inverse Mill’s 
ratio estimated on the subsample of insurers who choose to invest. Despite being significant in 
the first step, the coefficient for the agency issue variable, STOCK, is insignificant in the second 
step. Although PE is relatively complex compared to other asset classes (i.e. bonds), the lack of 
significance indicates the managerial discretion capabilities of stock insurers is not a factor when 
evaluating the amount of PE investment.  
 The coefficient for the underinvestment variable, LEVERAGE, is also negative and highly 
significant in the second step. This result provides evidence that as investors increase their leverage 
they will subsequently decrease their allocation to PE. Levered insurers are less likely to invest in 
PE since the reduction in investment portfolio risk can increase their ability to repay fixed 
claimants and decrease potential underinvestment costs. Furthermore, leverage has a large 
economic impact on the amount invested into PE. Since the average investor allocates 0.88% of 
their portfolio to PE an increase in leverage from the 25th to the 75th percentile would decrease PE 
allocation by approximately a third.  
 The coefficient for the asset-liability matching variable, LTPCT, is negatively related to 
the percentage invested into PE. Therefore, we find no evidence suggesting insurers match 
asset-liability matching needs when deciding how much of their portfolio they allocate to PE. We 
also find the coefficient of the regulation variable, NYPCT, is not significantly related to the 
percentage invested into PE. Consequently, we do not find evidence suggesting insurers take 
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regulatory constraints (e.g. risk monitoring and/or limiting managerial discretion) into account 
when deciding on the amount of PE investment.     
 Matching results from the first step, the coefficient of the reaching-for-yield variable, 
TREND, is negatively related to the percentage invested in PE. Unlike, Becker and Ivashina 
(2015), this result suggests insurer did not reach for yield within the PE asset class during the low 
interest rate environment following the 2008 financial crisis.  
 Once again, examining the control results provide additional insights. The coefficient of 
the size variable, SIZE, is positive and highly significantly related to the percentage of PE invested. 
Therefore, we find evidence supporting the assertion that larger investors are more capable of 
hiring an internal staff for investment specialization. Surprisingly, both the coefficients of the 
group membership variable, GROUP, and financial quality variable, RBC, are negative and highly 
significant. Both were assumed to have a positive relation to PE allocation. This finding runs 
counter to standalone insurers being risk adverse while group members assume additional risk 
because other group members can aid them during distress. In addition, the model predicts as an 
insurer increases their RBC ratio they will decrease their PE allocation. Therefore, the model 
suggests insurers with the largest “cushion” hold less PE than those with lower RBC. Taken 
together both of these results propose insurers who have the safest financial positions hold less PE 
than investment decision theory would predict.        
 Finally, the second step results for the riskiness of other investment choices provide 
additional evidence that investors do not follow a finite risk paradigm. The coefficients for 
traditionally risky portfolio variables, JUNK and REAL ESTATE are all positive and highly 
significantly related to the percentage of PE holdings. Furthermore, we find the coefficient for cash 
allocation, CASH, to be negative and highly significant. Consequently, these results indicate 
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investors who assume risk in one or more portfolio holdings assume greater risk in their portfolio 
with PE while those who exhibit safer investment tendencies continue their behavior with less PE 
allocation.    
[Insert Table X] 
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CONCLUSION 
Why do insurers invest in PE? This paper takes advantage of their detailed disclosure by 
constructing and estimating a model for the determinants of PE modeling. Consequently, we test 
theories relating how agency issues, underinvestment, asset maturity structure, regulation, home 
bias, and reaching-for-yield affect the PE investment decision and the percentage of PE 
investment.  
  We find mutual insurers are more likely to invest in PE than stock insurers, which implies 
managerial discretion is not a factor in PE investment among insurers. We also observe leverage 
is negatively related to both the decision to invest in PE and the percentage of PE investment which 
supports the underinvestment theory. This finding is consistent with insurers attempting to reduce 
their portfolio risk to decrease potential underinvestment costs. Interestingly, we do not find 
support that insurers match asset-liability matching needs when investing in PE. This finding is 
possibly explained by an increase in U.S. interest rate volatility, which has shortened liability 
durations. Additionally, insurers in highly regulated areas are less likely to invest in PE, which is 
consistent with regulators monitoring risk taking and limiting managerial discretion. Furthermore, 
we find support for the home bias hypothesis; insurers located within 100 miles of major PE 
markets are more likely to invest in PE. Finally, we find evidence inconsistent with the 
reaching-for-yield hypothesis, insurers did not increase their PE allocation following the 2008 
financial crisis.  
 We also find that firm size is the most economically significant determinant for both an 
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insurer’s decision to invest in PE and their PE allocation. In addition, we find group membership 
and higher amounts of risk-based capital are associated with lower PE allocation. Furthermore, we 
find evidence that insurers who do invest do not follow a finite risk paradigm. Rather insurers who 
assume risk in traditionally risky asset classes (e.g. junk bonds, real estate, and common stock) are 
more likely to invest in PE and hold a larger percentage of PE in their portfolio than otherwise 
while traditionally safer asset classes (e.g. cash and mortgages) are linked to lower PE allocation. 
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APPENDIX 1: PRIVATE EQUITY MODEL  
  
 
3
7 
Figure I 
Private Equity Model 
Figure I outlines the relationships between General Partners, Limited Partners, and Portfolio Companies for a generalized private equity fund. 
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APPENDIX 2: PRIVATE EQUITY FUND CYCLE 
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Figure II 
Private Equity Fund Cycle 
Figure II presents a generalized private equity fund cycle. 
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Table I 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Table I presents the six theoretically motivated variables of interest along with the eight control variables, their 
predicted signs relative to the proportion of private equity holdings  to total invested assets , and their definitions. 
 
Variable Predicted Impact on PE Definition 
 
Agency Issues 
STOCK + Dummy variable equal to 1 if stock organizational form, 0 if it has a 
mutual organizational form 
 
Underinvestment 
LEVERAGE - Natural log of the ratio of total liabilities to the sum of surplus, common 
stock, and preferred stock 
 
Asset-Liability Matching 
LTPCT + Percentage of net premiums written in long-tail lines to total net premiums 
written 
 
Excessive Regulation 
NYPCT - Percentage of net premiums written in the state of New York relative to 
total net premiums written in all states  
 
Home Bias 
LOCAL  + Dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer is within 100 miles of New York, 
Boston, or Palo Alto, 0 otherwise 
 
Reaching for Yield 
TREND + The aggregate amount of private equity under management for each year 
 
Controls 
SIZE + Natural log of total net admitted assets  
GROUP + Dummy variable equal to 1 if observation is at group level 
RBC + Ratio of total adjusted capital to authorized control level risk-based capital 
JUNK - Percentage of junk bond holdings to total invested assets  
REAL ESTATE - Percentage of real estate holdings to total invested assets  
COMMON - Percentage of common stock holdings to total invested assets  
CASH + Percentage of cash and short-term investments to total invested assets  
MORTGAGE + Percentage of mortgage holdings to total invested assets  
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Table II 
Insurer Classification of Private Equity Investments 
Table II reports the accuracy of private equity investments by insurers per year as reported in Schedule BA of their annual statutory filings . Data is collected from 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for years 2006 through 2013. We identify investments as correctly classified, misclassified, or 
omitted. The total number of incorrect classifications is the sum of both misclassified and omitted classifications.  
 
 No. of Investments No. Correctly Classified % Correct No. Misclassified % Misclassified No. Omitted % Omitted Total Incorrect % Incorrect 
2006 5,023 3,168 63.07% 652 12.98% 1,203 23.95% 1,855 36.93% 
2007 5,433 3,354 61.73% 738 13.58% 1,341 24.68% 2,079 38.27% 
2008 6,055 3,647 60.23% 772 12.75% 1,636 27.02% 2,408 39.77% 
2009 5,877 3,766 64.08% 730 12.42% 1,381 23.50% 2,111 35.92% 
2010 6,068 3,869 63.76% 785 12.94% 1,414 23.30% 2,199 36.24% 
2011 6,237 4,308 69.07% 843 13.52% 1,086 17.41% 1,929 30.93% 
2012 6,946 4,774 68.73% 973 14.01% 1,199 17.26% 2,172 31.27% 
2013 6,500 4,368 67.20% 831 12.78% 1,301 20.02% 2,132 32.80% 
Total 48,139 31,254 64.92% 6,324 13.14% 10,561 21.94% 16,885 35.08% 
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Table III 
Summary Statistics of Private Equity Investments 
Table III presents summary statistics of private equity investments  among investors. Data is collected from the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for years 2006 through 2013. 
 
Panel A – Fund Level  
Year No. of Investments Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Total 
2006 5,023 $5,410,126 $1,837,087 $10,036 $648,700,261 $16,511,868 $27,175,060,753 
2007 5,433 $6,653,324 $2,284,768 $10,006 $712,081,588 $20,251,189 $36,147,508,354 
2008 6,055 $6,692,012 $2,537,176 $10,028 $526,538,818 $17,409,362 $40,520,134,721 
2009 5,877 $6,896,942 $2,729,665 $10,186 $528,259,862 $18,110,210 $40,533,326,347 
2010 6,068 $7,967,133 $3,409,549 $10,161 $487,438,990 $17,410,877 $48,344,564,079 
2011 6,237 $8,059,647 $3,299,917 $10,001 $508,075,107 $16,874,781 $50,268,018,837 
2012 6,946 $7,959,058 $3,242,018 $10,023 $565,206,331 $16,904,535 $55,283,616,369 
2013 6,500 $8,220,826 $3,489,434 $10,298 $446,354,015 $17,080,696 $53,435,366,085 
 
Panel B – Investor Level 
Year No. of Investors Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
2006 153 $177,614,776 $7,692,914 $10,653 $3,806,766,207 $518,846,518 
2007 150 $240,983,389 $11,187,616 $13,906 $5,498,022,935 $739,383,328 
2008 147 $275,647,175 $12,968,558 $27,500 $5,581,381,188 $800,568,435 
2009 146 $277,625,523 $12,346,974 $17,286 $5,252,289,756 $803,470,812 
2010 152 $318,056,343 $13,230,369 $11,769 $6,231,971,327 $926,145,545 
2011 148 $339,648,776 $15,044,889 $25,456 $6,178,453,052 $960,078,650 
2012 153 $361,330,826 $21,254,635 $17,092 $6,212,379,297 $987,058,828 
2013 158 $338,198,520 $18,625,394 $12,301 $6,209,512,838 $963,490,420 
 
Panel C – Distribution of Funds Across Investors 
Year Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
2006 16.10 3 1 186 32.14 
2007 17.19 3 1 225 34.54 
2008 19.60 4 1 251 38.11 
2009 19.72 4 1 247 38.53 
2010 20.03 4 1 261 38.60 
2011 20.93 5 1 244 39.19 
2012 22.19 4 1 277 44.68 
2013 20.06 4 1 261 44.34 
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Table IV 
Summary Statistics of Variables 
Table IV reports summary statistics of regression analysis  variables. Data is collected from the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for years 2006 through 2013. PE is the ratio of private equity to total invested assets. 
STOCK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurer has a stock organizational form and 0 if it has a mutual organizational 
form. LEVERAGE is the natural log of total liabilities to the sum of surplus, common stock, and preferred stock. LTPCT is 
the percentage of net premiums written in long-tail lines to total net premiums written. NYPCT is the percentage of net 
premiums written in the state of New York relative to total net premiums written in all states . LOCAL is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if insurer is within 100 miles of New York, Boston, or Palo Alto, 0 otherwise. SIZE represents the natural log of 
total net admitted assets. GROUP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurer combines into a group observation and 0 if a 
standalone insurer. RBC is the ratio of total adjusted capital to authorized control level risk-based capital. JUNK is the 
percentage of junk bonds to total invested assets. REAL ESTATE is the percentage of real estate holdings to total invested 
assets. COMMON is the percentage of common stock to total invested assets. CASH is the percentage of cash and short-term 
investments to total invested assets. MORTGAGE is the percentage of mortgage holdings to total invested assets. Independent 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to remove the presence of outliers. 
 
Panel A – Full Sample 
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev. 
PE 8,321 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 6.66% 0.52% 
STOCK 8,321 0.69 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 
LEVERAGE 8,321 0.54 0.46 -3.35 3.64 1.14 
LTPCT 8,321 82.33% 94.03% 0.00% 100.00% 26.32% 
NYPCT 8,321 7.07% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 21.33% 
LOCAL 8,321 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.41 
SIZE 8,321 19.08 18.66 15.84 26.09 2.32 
GROUP 8,321 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
RBC 8,321 12.66 8.28 0.00 246.64 20.01 
JUNK 8,321 1.25% 0.05% 0.00% 14.19% 2.27% 
REAL ESTATE 8,321 1.26% 0.00% 0.00% 21.32% 2.75% 
COMMON 8,321 11.07% 6.96% 0.00% 70.52% 12.88% 
CASH 8,321 16.58% 7.94% 0.00% 100.00% 21.71% 
MORTGAGE 8,321 1.50% 0.00% 0.00% 30.09% 4.23% 
 
Panel B – Investors 
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev. 
PE 1,195 0.88% 0.41% 0.00% 6.66% 1.10% 
STOCK 1,195 0.65 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 
LEVERAGE 1,195 1.31 1.11 -1.47 3.64 1.07 
LTPCT 1,195 84.93% 92.56% 0.00% 100.00% 22.32% 
NYPCT 1,195 6.39% 2.57% 0.00% 100.00% 12.15% 
LOCAL 1,195 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
SIZE 1,195 22.58 22.53 16.20 26.09 2.09 
GROUP 1,195 0.88 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 
RBC 1,195 8.72 7.94 0.00 119.15 5.72 
JUNK 1,195 2.90% 2.39% 0.00% 14.19% 2.60% 
REAL ESTATE 1,195 0.84% 0.32% 0.00% 17.97% 1.55% 
COMMON 1,195 11.87% 8.71% 0.00% 65.22% 11.81% 
CASH 1,195 5.49% 3.35% 0.00% 60.23% 6.94% 
MORTGAGE 1,195 4.00% 0.45% 0.00% 25.51% 5.45% 
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Table V 
Differences of Means and Medians - Univariate Analysis 
Table V presents differences of means and medians for the insurer specific characteristics. STOCK is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the insurer has a stock organizational form and 0 if it has a mutual organizational form. LEVERAGE is the natural log 
of total liabilities to the sum of surplus, common stock, and preferred stock. LTPCT is the percentage of net premiums written 
in long-tail lines to total net premiums written. NYPCT is the percentage of net premiums written in the state of New York 
relative to total net premiums written in all states . LOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer is within 100 miles of 
New York, Boston, or Palo Alto, 0 otherwise. SIZE represents the natural log of total net admitted assets. GROUP is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the insurer combines into a group observation and 0 if a standalone insurer. RBC is the ratio of total 
adjusted capital to authorized control level risk-based capital. JUNK is the percentage of junk bonds to total invested assets. 
REAL ESTATE is the percentage of real estate holdings to total invested assets. COMMON is the percentage of common 
stock to total invested assets. CASH is the percentage of cash and short-term investments to total invested assets. 
MORTGAGE is the percentage of mortgage holdings to total invested assets. Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels to remove the presence of outliers.  
 
 
Variable   Non-Investors Investors Difference p-value 
 
Agency Issues 
STOCK 
Mean 0.69 0.65 0.04 0.003 
Median 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.003 
 
Underinvestment 
LEVERAGE 
Mean 0.42 1.31 -0.89 <.001 
Median 0.37 1.11 -0.84 <.001 
 
Asset-Liability Matching 
LTPCT 
Mean 81.90% 84.93% -3.03% <.001 
Median 94.14% 92.56% 1.58% 0.366 
 
Regulation 
NYPCT 
Mean 7.18% 6.39% 0.79% 0.234 
Median 0.00% 2.57% -2.57% <.001 
 
Home Bias 
LOCAL 
Mean 0.17 0.48 -0.31 <.001 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 <.001 
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Table V (continued) 
Variable  Non-Investors Investors Difference p-value 
 
Controls 
SIZE 
Mean 18.49 22.58 -4.09 <.001 
Median 18.22 22.53 -4.31 <.001 
 
GROUP 
Mean 0.39 0.88 -0.49 <.001 
Median 0.00 1.00 -1.00 <.001 
 
RBC 
Mean 13.32 8.72 4.60 <.001 
Median 8.36 7.94 0.42 <.001 
 
JUNK 
Mean 0.97% 2.90% -1.93% <.001 
Median 0.00% 2.39% -2.39% <.001 
 
REAL ESTATE 
Mean 1.33% 0.84% 0.49% <.001 
Median 0.00% 0.32% -0.32% <.001 
 
COMMON 
Mean 10.94% 11.87% -0.93% 0.020 
Median 6.66% 8.71% -2.05% <.001 
 
CASH 
Mean 18.44% 5.49% 12.95% <.001 
Median 9.25% 3.35% 5.90% <.001 
 
MORTGAGE 
Mean 1.07% 4.00% -2.93% <.001 
Median 0.00% 0.45% -0.45% <.001 
Observations 7,126 1,195   
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Table VI 
Private Equity Investments with NAIC Designation Codes 
Table VI presents private equity investments with NAIC designation codes. Data is collected from the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for years 2006 through 2013. The NAIC 1 designation is assigned 
to obligations exhibiting the highest quality where credit risk is at its lowest and the issuer’s credit profile is stable. 
The NAIC 2 designation is assigned to obligations of high quality where credit risk is low but may increase in the 
intermediate future and the issuer’s credit profile are reasonably stab le. The NAIC 3 designation is assigned to 
obligations of medium quality where credit risk is intermediate and the issuer’s credit profile has elements of 
instability. The NAIC 4 designation is assigned to obligations of low quality where Credit risk is high and the issuer’s 
credit profile is volatile. The NAIC 5 designation is assigned to obligations of the lowest credit quality, which are not 
in or near default, where credit risk is at its highest and credit profile is highly volatile, but currently the is suer has the 
capacity to meet its obligations . NAIC 5* is assigned by the Securities Valuations Office (SVO) to certain obligations 
when an insurer certifies: (1) that documentation necessary to permit a full credit analysis of a security does not exist  
and (2) the issuer or obligor is current on all contracted interest and principal payments and (3) the insurer has an 
actual expectation of ultimate repayment of all contracted interest and principal. The NAIC 6 designation is assigned 
to obligations that are in or near default. NAIC 6* is assigned by an insurer to an obligation in lieu of reporting the 
obligation with appropriate documentation to the SVO for a full credit analysis or filing the certification required for 
obtaining an NAIC 5* Designation. 
 
Year NAIC 1 NAIC 2 NAIC 3 NAIC 4 NAIC 5 NAIC 5* NAIC 6 NAIC 6* Total 
2006 12 1 6 3 26 39 35 0 122 
2007 11 0 0 10 36 41 19 0 117 
2008 9 0 0 9 21 47 21 1 108 
2009 11 0 2 6 34 47 18 1 119 
2010 10 1 2 0 39 51 16 0 119 
2011 25 0 0 0 29 64 4 0 122 
2012 24 2 0 0 34 76 2 0 138 
2013 27 0 0 3 31 84 0 0 145 
Totals 129 4 10 31 250 449 115 2 990 
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Table VII 
Investor Distribution Over Time 
Table VII presents the number of Non-Investors, Investors, and new Investors over the sample period. New investors 
are defined as insurers who do not invest in private equity the prior year, but then choose to invest the next year. Data 
is collected from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for years 2006 through 2013. 
 
Year Non-Investors Investors New Investors 
2006 1,222 153 - 
2007 1,216 150 11 
2008 1,182 147 7 
2009 1,140 146 9 
2010 1,091 152 10 
2011 1,062 148 8 
2012 1,045 153 13 
2013 1,015 158 18 
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Table VIII 
U.S. Bond and Private Equity Investments Over Time 
Table VIII presents trends in the percentage of U.S. bond and private equity investments of total invested assets by 
private equity investors . Data is collected from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for 
years 2006 through 2013. 
 
Year Private Equity U.S. Bonds 
2006 0.73% 6.24% 
2007 0.94% 4.55% 
2008 1.08% 5.32% 
2009 1.09% 6.97% 
2010 1.20% 6.89% 
2011 1.22% 7.23% 
2012 1.29% 6.80% 
2013 1.25% 6.61% 
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Table IX 
First Step Heckman Correction Results for Private Equity Investments 
Table IX reports results for the first step of the Heckman’s two-stage estimation of investor characteristics on private 
equity investment. The first step is a probit regression (examining the determinants of the investment decision) 
estimated on the full sample and is as follows:  
 
𝐷𝑜𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑌𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑅𝐵𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝐽𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽12𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽13 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽14𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐺𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
DoInvest is a binary variable equal to 1 if the insurer chooses to invest and 0 otherwise. STOCK is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the insurer has a stock organizational form and 0 if it has a mutual organizational form. LEVERAGE is 
the natural log of total liabilities to the sum of surplus, common stock, and preferred stock. LTPCT is the percentage 
of net premiums written in long-tail lines to total net premiums written. NYPCT is the percentage of net premiums  
written in the state of New York relative to total net premiums written in all states . LOCAL is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if insurer is within 100 miles of New York, Boston, or Palo Alto, 0 otherwise. TREND is the aggregate amount 
of private equity under management for each year. SIZE represents the natural log of total net admitted assets. GROUP 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurer combines into a group observation and 0 if a standalone insurer. RBC is 
the ratio of total adjusted capital to authorized control level risk-based capital. JUNK is the percentage of junk bonds 
to total invested assets. REAL ESTATE is the percentage of real estate holdings to total invested assets. COMMON 
is the percentage of common stock to total invested assets. CASH is the percentage of cash and short-term investments 
to total invested assets. MORTGAGE is the percentage of mortgage holdings to total invested assets. Independent 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to remove the presence of outliers. Implied Change in Probability  
indicates the likelihood of PE investment where 1) the value of a dummy variable changes from 0 to 1, 2) the value 
of a continuous variable changes from the 25th to 75th percentile of its distribution, and 3) the value of TREND changes 
from the aggregate amount of private equity under management from 2006 to 2013 while holding the remaining  
independent variables at their mean values.   
 
 Full Sample  Top Size Quartile 
 Coefficient 
Implied Change in 
Probability 
p-value 
 
Coefficient 
Implied Change in 
Probability 
p-value 
Agency Issues        
STOCK -0.159 -0.014 0.003  -0.526 -0.206 <.001 
        
Underinvestment        
LEVERAGE -0.064 -0.006 0.064  -0.110 -0.074 0.035 
        
Asset-Liability Matching        
LTPCT -0.365 -0.007 0.001  -0.103 -0.009 0.541 
        
Regulation        
NYPCT -0.413 -0.001 0.012  -0.900 -0.032 <.001 
        
Home Bias        
LOCAL 0.190 0.018 0.001  0.240 0.095 0.001 
        
Reaching-for-Yield        
TREND -0.000 -0.007 0.303  -0.000 -0.077 0.079 
        
Controls        
SIZE 0.478 0.127 <.001  0.544 0.468 <.001 
GROUP 0.060 0.005 0.321  0.162 0.064 0.100 
RBC -0.013 -0.009 <.001  -0.025 -0.046 <.001 
JUNK 6.982 0.008 <.001  9.833 0.145 <.001 
REAL ESTATE 2.468 0.002 0.028  -0.636 -0.002 0.838 
COMMON 0.391 0.005 0.088  0.746 0.042 0.056 
CASH -0.468 -0.006 0.067  -1.206 -0.023 0.033 
MORTGAGE 2.945 0.000 <.001  2.539 0.040 0.002 
Observations 8,320  2,080 
Pseudo R2 0.484  0.307 
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Table X 
Second Step Heckman Correction Results for Private Equity Investments 
Table X reports results for the second step of the Heckman’s two-stage estimation of investor characteristics on private 
equity investment. The second step is a regression including the inverse Mill’s ratio estimated on the subsample of 
insurers who choose to invest. It examines the determinants of the percentage invested and is as follows: 
 
             𝑃𝐸𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑌𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇2008𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑅𝐵𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐽𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ 𝛽12 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐺𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝜎𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1 
 
PE is the percentage of private equity to total invested assets. STOCK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurer 
has a stock organizational form and 0 if it has a mutual organizational form. LEVERAGE is the natural log of total 
liabilities to the sum of surplus, common stock, and preferred stock. LTPCT is the percentage of net premiums 
written in long-tail lines to total net premiums written. NYPCT is the percentage of net premiums written in the state 
of New York relative to total net premiums written in all states . TREND is the aggregate amount of private equity 
under management for each year. SIZE represents the natural log of total net admitted assets. GROUP is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the insurer combines into a group observation and 0 if a standalone insurer. RBC is the ratio of 
total adjusted capital to authorized control level risk-based capital. JUNK is the percentage of junk bonds to total 
invested assets. REAL ESTATE is the percentage of real estate holdings to total invested assets. COMMON is the 
percentage of common stock to total invested assets. CASH is the percentage of cash and short-term investments to 
total invested assets. MORTGAGE is the percentage of mortgage holdings to total invested assets. LAMBDA is the 
inverse Mills ratio from the first step of the analysis. Independent variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels 
to remove the presence of outliers. 
 
 Full Sample 
 Coefficient 
Implied Change in 
Dependent Variable 
p-value 
Agency Issues    
STOCK 0.0003572 0.0003572 0.635 
    
Underinvestment    
LEVERAGE -0.0019797 -0.0033625 <0.001 
    
Asset-Liability Matching    
LTPCT -0.0044019 -0.0010079 0.012 
    
Regulation    
NYPCT 0.0001189 0.0000103 0.965 
    
Home Bias    
TREND -0.0000013 -0.0027716 0.010 
    
Controls    
SIZE 0.0028355 0.0083252 <.001 
GROUP -0.0046827 -0.0046827 <.001 
RBC -0.0001540 -0.0006821 0.012 
JUNK 0.0437302 0.0018077 0.010 
REAL ESTATE 0.0346693 0.0002831 0.097 
COMMON 0.0061301 0.0008390 0.122 
CASH -0.0211543 -0.0009668 <.001 
MORTGAGE 0.0346826 0.0027947 <.001 
LAMBDA 0.0085245  <.001 
Observations 1,195 
R2 0.086 
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PART 2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 There has been a substantial decline in the number of U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs) 
since 2000. The market averaged 310 IPOs per year from 1980 through 2000, but only averaged 
111 IPOs per year for the past 15 years (Ritter, 2016). This decline is mysterious considering real 
GDP has doubled over this timeframe and economic theory suggests the number of IPOs should 
also double (Smith et al., 2014). Consequently, the deterioration of new offerings has raised 
concerns. First, commentators argue the decline in IPOs cost the U.S. economy significant 
employment opportunities (Weild and Kim, 2009; IPO Task Force, 2011; and Levy and Pruitt, 
2012). Second, since IPOs are typically growing companies, the decline in employment 
opportunities also raises concern innovation is deterred (Weild and Kim, 2010; and Weild, Kim, 
and Newport, 2013). Proponents of deregulation argue the decrease in IPOs signal a weak capital 
market where infusion is not widely available.   
In order to reinvigorate the IPO market, policymakers invited comments for possible 
solutions. The most prominent concern raised was that regulatory costs deterred small firms from 
going public. In response policymakers included a provision in the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
exempts firms with less than $75 million in public equity from Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 
404(b) reporting. The Jumpstart Our Business Start-Up (JOBS) Act further reduced regulatory 
costs for small firms by extending the 404(b) exemption for a greater proportion of firms by 
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creating the Emerging Growth Companies1 classification. More recently, the SEC has attempted 
to rein in other regulatory costs by amending Regulation A2 to preempt blue-sky registration3 for 
issues of greater than $20 million and increase the maximum amount sought to $50 million (SEC, 
2015). Others argue the IPO decline is the result of weak secondary market support for small firms 
(IPO Task Force, 2011 and Weild, Kim, and Newport, 2012). Weild, Kim, and Newport (2012) 
argue diminished spreads remove compensation for market makers and decreases liquidity for 
small firms. In response to such claims, the SEC commissioned the Pilot Tick Size Program to 
examine the effects of increasing the minimum tick size (SEC, 2014). Other solutions that have 
been proposed include firms providing an annual fee for Designated Market Makers (DMMs) to 
enhance liquidity (Bessembinder, Hao, and Zheng, Forthcoming) or the creation of venture 
exchanges similar to those of the London’s AIM and Toronto’s TSX Venture (SEC, 2015).  
                                                                 
1 “The term ‘emerging growth company’ means  an issuer that had total annual gross revenues of less than 
$1,000,000,000 (as such amount is indexed for inflation every 5 years by the Commission to reflect the change in 
the Consumer Price Index for All  Urban Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, setting the threshold 
to the nearest 1,000,000) during its most recently completed fiscal year. An issuer that is an emerging growth 
company as of the first day of that fiscal year shall continue to be deemed an emerging growth company until  the 
earliest of—‘‘(A) the last day of the fiscal year of the issuer during which it had total annual gross revenues of 
$1,000,000,000 (as such amount is indexed for inflation every 5 years  by the Commission to reflect the change in 
the Consumer Price Index for All  Urban Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, setting the threshold 
to the nearest 1,000,000) or more; ‘‘(B) the last day of the fiscal year of the issuer following the fifth anniversary of 
the date of the first sale of common equity securities of the issuer pursuant to an effective registration statement 
under this title; ‘‘(C) the date on which such issuer has, during the previous 3-year period, issued more than 
$1,000,000,000 in non-convertible debt; or ‘‘(D) the date on which such issuer is deemed to be a ‘large accelerated 
fi ler’, as defined in section 240.12b–2 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor  thereto.’’. The 
Jumpstart Our Business Start-Up Act (2012). 
2 Regulation A is an exemption from the Securities Act of 1933, which permits unregistered public offerings by 
security-holders of a company. Prior Regulation A offerings were subject to state-level registration and qualification 
requirements. However, the prior form of Regulation A was rarely used and critics suggested the cost and complexity 
of federal and state law compliance made it less practical than other Securities Act exemptions. On March 25, 2015, 
the SEC adopted final rules to implement Section 401 of the JOBS Act by expanding Regulation A into two tiers: Tier 
1, for securities offerings of up to $20 mill ion in a 12-month period; and Tier 2, for securities offerings of up to $50 
mill ion in a 12-month period. The resulting exemption is referred to as “Regulation A+” and enables firms to bypass 
blue sky laws under certain conditions. SEC (2015)  
3 “In addition to the federal securities laws, every state has its own set of securities laws —commonly referred to as 
"Blue Sky Laws"—that are designed to protect investors against fraudulent sales practices and activities. While these 
laws do vary from state to state, most state laws typically require companies making offerings of securities to register 
their offerings before they can be sold in a particular state, unless a specific state exemption is availab le. The laws 
also l icense brokerage firms, their brokers, and investment adviser representatives.” SEC (2015) 
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However, there is significant disagreement for the underlying reason the U.S. IPO market 
remains depressed among academics (Davidoff and Rose, 2014). The regulatory overreach 
hypothesis argues the combination of regulatory efforts (SOX, Regulation FD, the 2003 Global 
Settlement4, order-handling rules, and diminished spreads) have led to a market ecosystem that is 
unsuitable for small firms, which account for the majority of IPOs. Since 2008, virtually all policy 
recommendations have aimed to address these concerns.  
On the other hand, the economies of scope hypothesis by Gao et al. (2013) posits getting 
big fast is more important than it used to be due to increases in globalization and technologica l 
innovation that has decreased profitability among small firms. Consequently, for small firms, 
growing organically is an inferior strategy to growing quickly through mergers and acquisitions. 
Therefore, small firms are more apt to making acquisitions or selling out in a trade sale than 
conducting an IPO. Their study demonstrates evidence that is inconsistent with the regulatory 
overreach hypothesis while consistent with their economies of scope hypothesis. However, their 
analysis never includes direct economies of scope measurements. Rather, their main point relies 
on time-trend dummy analysis, which demonstrates something other than SOX is contributing to 
the IPO decline.  
I find the following results. First, I find direct evidence for the economies of scope 
hypothesis. Private firms with less than $50 million in sales are more likely to be acquired than to 
IPO when their industry has higher economies of scope. However, despite the prior finding, I do 
not find evidence that 3-year buy-and-hold returns for IPOs are negatively impacted with high 
economies of scope levels. Finally, I find economies of scope is negatively related to firms 
                                                                 
4 The Global Settlement was finalized on April  28, 2003 among the SEC, NASD, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), the National Association of State Securities Administrators (NASAA), and the New York State Attorney 
General which outlined penalties and reforms based on conflicts of interest between research and investment 
banking. 
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adopting a dual tracking strategy, but does not explain sell-out premiums for acquired private 
firms.    
This study contributes to the IPO debate. First, using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
methodology of Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013), I calculate a direct metric for measuring economies 
of scope measurements (EOS) for Fama-French (1997) industries. Second, I directly test the 
economies of scope hypothesis while using DES. Third, to resolve contradictory findings relating 
IPOs with competitive markets5, I use EOS to provide insight into the trade sale/IPO decision for 
private firms. Finally, findings may help guide future policy. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II reviews the prior literature on the 
competing hypotheses for the U.S. IPO market decline. Section III develops our hypotheses on the 
economies of scope effect on the both IPOs and trade sales of private firms. Section IV explains 
the research approach. Section V introduces and describes the data sources and sample. Section 
VI presents the results. Section VI summarizes the findings and concludes. 
 
  
                                                                 
5 Brau, Francis, and Kohers (2003) find private firms prefer an acquisi tion over an IPO in competitive industries. 
However, Bayar and Chemmanur (2012) find the opposite result. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Regulatory Overreach   
 The regulatory overreach hypothesis6 argues SOX, Regulation FD, the 2003 Global 
Settlement, order-handling rules, and reductions in quoted spreads have created an environment 
unsuitable for small firms. Initial focus centered solely on the direct and indirect costs of SOX. 
Commentators suggest the SOX implementation costs are disproportionally greater for small firms 
because most of the costs are fixed (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; IPO Task Force, 2011). A 
number of empirical studies find evidence indicating small firms were disproportionally effected 
by SOX7. These findings extend to IPOs since most originate as small firms. Thus, SOX may act 
as a deterrent for small firms entering the public market. Furthermore, Bova et al. (2013) discover 
SOX decreased the likelihood that US small private companies would go public and instead choose 
to be acquired. 
However, other studies find conflicting results. Brau and Fawcett (2006) survey CFOs who 
either did not file or withdrew from an IPO and report SOX is not a significant concern in their 
decisions. Johnson and Madura (2009) find U.S. IPOs have less valuation uncertainty after post-
SOX due to decreases in asymmetric information. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2013) examine the 
effects of globalization on IPOs worldwide. They note while there has been an IPO decline in both 
                                                                 
6 Gao et al. (2013) present the regulatory overreach hypothesis as a catch-all for arguments suggesting the lack of 
IPO activity is due to SOX, Regulation FD, the 2003 Global Settlement, and/or analyst coverage.  
7 GOA (2006); Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007); Zhang (2007); Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007); Wintoki (2007); 
Ahmed et al. (2010); Bartlett (2009); Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley (2009); Il iev (2010); Kang, Liu, and Qi  
(2010). 
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the U.S. and Europe, regulatory changes do not explain dip in U.S. IPOs. Gao et al. (2013) provide 
counterevidence for the detrimental effects of SOX. They demonstrate small firms were 
unprofitable prior to SOX and even after removing associated SOX costs small firms remain 
unprofitable after SOX implementation.    
Practitioners often cite changes in tick sizes and analyst coverage as reasons for U.S. IPO 
decline (Weild and Kim, 2008, 2009 and 2010; Weild, Kim, and Newport 2012 and 2013; and IPO 
Task Force, 2011). They argue diminished spreads removed compensation for capital investment, 
research, and sales support for smaller firms and therefore led to decreased liquidity for those 
firms. The academic literature provides some support for their assertions. Kadapakkam, 
Krishnamurthy, and Tse (2005) study brokers’ incentives for using stock splits during the 1/8th 
pricing period and decimalization. Their results show decimalization leads to decreases in average 
buy order size, frequency of small trades, and order imbalance toward the buy side. Furthermore, 
while there is evidence of positive abnormal returns around ex-date during the 1/8th pricing period, 
they do not find this in the decimalization period.  
Prior studies show analyst coverage can increase share value8. Both Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2010) and Groysberg (2013) note the number of analysts has declined since the Global Settlement. 
Mola, Rau, and Khorana (2012) investigate the impact of analyst coverage on firms following the 
Global Settlement. Using a matched sample, they find firms that lose coverage post-IPO 
experienced less liquidity, trading volume, institutional ownership and are more likely to delist. 
They conclude the Global Settlement provides disincentives for analysts in traditional soft-dollar 
brokerage houses to cover small or mid-sized firms because these firms do not produce order flows 
to offset the costs. Davidoff and Rose (2014) provide another explanation by examining the  
                                                                 
8 Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001; Irvine, 2003; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter, 2008; 
Demiroglu and Ryngaert, 2010; Loh and Stulz, 2011 
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lifecycle of small firms. They believe investors have grown disinterested in small IPOs because of 
their below market performance and supply side changes are the reason for the disappearance in 
IPOs. Gao et al. (2013) contradict the previously mentioned studies as they find analyst coverage 
remained at similar levels for the 3 years following an IPO. 
Economies of Scope 
In response to the regulatory overreach arguments, Gao et al. (2013), Ritter, Signori, and 
Vismara (2013), and Ritter (2014) offer the economies of scope hypothesis as a competing 
explanation. They argue getting big fast is more important than it used to be due to increases in 
globalization and technological innovation that has decreased profitability among small firms. 
Consequently, for small firms, growing organically is an inferior strategy to growing quickly 
through mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, small firms are more apt to making acquisitions or 
selling out in a trade sale than conducting an IPO.  
While they do not use a direct economies of scope metric, Gao et al. observe indirect 
evidence consistent with their hypothesis while inconsistent with the regulatory overreach 
hypothesis. They report the percentage of unprofitable small firms has increased substantially since 
1997. Furthermore, among small firms that do go public, many are involved in M&A deals as 
either a target or acquirer. In time-series analysis, they observe a negative time-trend in scaled IPO 
volume, which is economically and statistically greater for small firms than large firms, while 
finding no relation between SOX implementation and scaled IPO volume. Ritter et al. expand upon 
the prior findings by investigating Europe’s IPO decline. Though Ritter et al. conclude market 
conditions partially explain the decline of small firm IPOs, they report the same negative 
time-trend pattern without the presence of regulatory overreach arguments. 
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HYPOTHESES 
 In this section, I develop hypotheses extending the study of Gao et al. (2013) which include 
a direct measurement for economies of scope. In addition, I develop hypothetical extensions 
specifically for small firm IPOs since the decline (increase) in IPOs (trade sales) is greater than 
large firm IPOs (Gao et al., 2013; Davidoff and Rose, 2014). Therefore, following Gao et al., the 
first hypothesis is as stated:        
Hypothesis 1: Private firms in industries with large economies of scope are less likely to 
exit via IPO, ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 1a: Small private firms in industries with large economies of scope are less 
likely to exit via IPO, ceteris paribus. 
Intuitively, if economies of scope limit IPOs as an exit mechanism then private firms will 
increase their propensity for trade sales. Gao et al. (2013) and Ritter et al. (2013) provide indirect 
support for this conjecture in the U.S. and European markets respectively. Consequently, the 
second hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis 2: Private firms in industries with large economies of scope are more likely to 
exit via trade sale, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2a: Small private firms in industries with large economies of scope are more 
likely to exit via trade sale, ceteris paribus. 
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Economies of scope should depress the profitability of small firms. Therefore, investors 
should earn lower returns for small firm IPOs. Gao et al. (2013) calculate three-year buy-and-hold 
returns of IPOs and report small firms underperform on both market value (-19.5%) and style 
adjusted (-30.3%) basis from 2001-2009. Similarly, Ritter et al. (2013) find European small firm 
IPOs have a three-year buy-and-hold average return of -2.9% from 1995-2008, relative to 14.6% 
for large firm IPOs. Consequently, I predict the following:  
Hypothesis 3: Small firm initial public offerings in industries with large economies of scope 
underperform on three-year buy-and-hold basis, ceteris paribus. 
I extend the analysis by investigating if economies of scope affect how firms approach the 
IPO/trade sale decision. Since the economies of scope hypothesis predicts lower potential returns 
for both IPO and trade sales, then private firms should look for alternative strategies that maximize 
their value. One such strategy is the practice of dual-tracking. Dual-tracking occurs when a target 
files to go public, but enters into negotiations with a buyer simultaneously. In theory, the target 
undergoes the filing process expense to both signal their quality and alleviate asymmetr ic 
information between the buyer and target. Dual-tracking can be subdivided into two segments: 1) 
public dual-tracking where the target is acquired after their IPO and 2) private dual-tracking where 
the target is acquired before the IPO process can complete. Empirical evidence by Brau, Sutton, 
and Hatch (2010) suggest dual-tracking is a preferential option to solely committing to either an 
IPO or trade sale. They discover firms who utilize a private dual-tracking strategy earn a premium 
of 22-26% over a single-track strategy (acquisition alone) and a public dual-tracking strategy earn 
a premium of 18-21% over a single-track strategy. Consequently, I expect firms facing economy 
of scope pressure to seek such a strategy to increase their eventual exit.    
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Hypothesis 4: Private firms in industries with large economies of scope have an increased 
propensity to adopt dual-tracking strategies, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 5: Private firms in industries with large economies of scope receive a higher 
risk-adjusted payoff with a dual-track private sell-out than a single-track (dual-track) 
trade sell, ceteris paribus. 
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METHODS 
 I calculate economies of scope (EOS) measurements using data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) to directly test the economies of scope hypothesis. While frontier efficiency methods are 
commonly used in the economics literature, DEA has recently been applied to an increasing 
number of banking, insurer, and financial studies (Habib and Ljungvist, 2005; Nguyen and 
Swanson, 2007; Cummins et al., 2010; and Leverty and Qian, 2011). DEA methodology has two 
advantages over regression analysis. First, DEA provides an ordered ranking compared to the best 
possible performance where regression analysis provides efficiency that is relative to the average 
performance. Second, DEA allows for inputs and outputs to have different weights among firms 
whereas other efficiency measures (i.e. ROA) require fixed weighting schemes.   
 DEA estimates an optimal frontier for each firm based on its inputs and outputs. Efficiency 
scores range from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the firm is operating at optimal performance. I follow 
Demerjian et al.’s method (2012, 2013) for output and input selection. The output is Total Revenue 
of the firm (SALE). The inputs are 1) Cost of Goods Sold (COGS), 2) Selling, General & 
Administrative Expense (XSGA), 3) Net Property, Plant, & Equipment (PPENT), 4) Capitalized 
Operating Leases (MRC1, MRC2, MRC3, MRC4, and MRC5) which is calculated as the 
discounted present value of the next five years of required operating lease payments with a 
discount rate of 10%, 5) Capitalized Research & Development (XRD) which is calculated as 
𝑅𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑝 = ∑ (1 + 0.2𝑡) × 𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑥𝑝
0
𝑡=−4 , 6) Goodwill (GDWL) which is calculated as the premium 
paid over the fair value of a business acquisition, and 7) Other Intangibles (INTAN – GDWL) 
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which reflects the other acquired and capitalized intangibles such as client lists, patent costs, and 
copyrights. I define economies of scope (EOS) as the efficiency of diversified firms for each Fama-
French (1997) industrial classification in each year. I follow Denis et al. (2002) by designating 
firms as diversified if they report more than one segment for that given year as reported in 
Compustat Segments. 
After creating the EOS metric, I test the impact industry specific economies of scope on 
the exit strategies of private firms. I follow Brau et al. (2003), Bayar and Chemmanur (2012), and 
Bova et al. (2014) and test for the IPO versus trade sale decision by controlling for industry-related, 
marketing-timing, deal-related, and demand-for-fund factors. I test hypotheses 1 and 2 with 
Equation 1: 
𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑂𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑂𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐵𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐷𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛽12 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹_𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽13 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽14 𝐻𝑀𝐿_𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽15 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽16 𝑆𝑀𝐵_𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑖
+ 𝛽17 𝑅𝐹𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
(1) 
where IPOd is equal to 1 for IPO exits, and 0 for trade sales, EOS is the economies of scope for 
the firm’s industry in the year they exit, and SMALL equals 1 if the firm had $50 million ($2009) 
or less in total sales in year prior to exit and 0 otherwise. Definitions for the remaining independent 
variables are available in the appendix.  
In order to test hypothesis 3, I calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal return, BHARi,t, for 
each IPO firm with respect to the CRSP value-weighted index. The buy-and-hold returns are 
calculated from the first CRSP-reported closing price through the earlier of the third-year 
anniversary of the IPO, the delisting date, or December 31, 2014. Small and large company IPOs 
are defined based on whether the pre-IPO last twelve months sales are less than or greater than 
$50 million. IPOs are also subdivided into tertiles based upon the EOS for their industry in their 
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IPO year. All returns include dividends and capital gains, including the index returns. I calculate 
BHARi,t using the equation: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∏ (1 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
min (𝑡,𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 )
𝑡=1
− ∏ (1 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
min(𝑡,𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡)
𝑡=1
, 
 
(2) 
Where Ri,t is the net return in period t on stock I and Rm,t is the net return in period t on the value-
weighted market. 
To test if high economies of scope influence private firms to take a trade sale over a dual-
tracking strategy, I follow Brau et al. (2010) and control industry type, firm size, VC-backing, and 
market environment. I test hypothesis 4 with Equation 3:  
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘 = 1 𝑜𝑟 2)
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐶
+ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑠 + 𝜀   
 
(3) 
where Track equals 1 for single-track sell-outs and equals 2 for either dual private sell-outs or dual 
public sell-outs.   
To test if EOS impacts the premium in takeovers, I follow Brau et al. (2010) and control 
for if the acquirer and target are in the same industry, the method of payment, industry type, target 
size, and VC-backing. I test hypothesis 5 with Equation 4: 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿 +  𝛽3𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 +  𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆 +  𝛽5𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐼𝑋
+ 𝛽7𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽9𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖   
 
(4) 
 
where PREMIUM is the transaction value divided by the sell-out firm’s sales in the period prior to 
the takeover announcement, DUAL is equal to 1 if the sell-out target is a private that filed for an 
IPO and later withdrew or if the sell-out target is a formerly private firm that completed an IPO 
and was acquired within a year of the IPO, 0 otherwise. Definitions for all variables are available 
in the appendix.  
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DATA 
The IPO sample includes U.S. IPOs from 2007-2014 with an offer price of at least $5 per 
share, excluding ADRs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, natural resource limited 
partnerships, small best efforts offers, financial firms, and stocks not listed on CRSP. The IPO 
sample is obtained from Jay Ritter’s IPO website along with Thomson Financial Securities Data 
and SEC filings on EDGAR. I obtain data from Compustat Fundamentals and Segment databases 
for the DEA inputs and outputs. I collect the following variables for all firms from Compustat: 
Total Revenue (SALE), Cost of Goods Sold (COGS), Selling, General & Administrative Expense 
(XSGA), Net Property, Plant, & Equipment (PPENT), Capitalized Operating Leases (MRC1, 
MRC2, MRC3, MRC4, and MRC5) Capitalized Research & Development (XRD), Goodwill 
(GDWL), and Other Intangibles (INTAN – GDWL). I acquire firm return data from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I collect acquisition data from Bloomberg. Following Brau 
et al. (2010) I use a $50 million takeover cut-off. I require firms in the dual tracking sample to 
have values for both assets and sales prior to takeover. The final sample includes 626 IPOs and 
388 Trade Sales for IPO versus trade sale analysis and 188 single-track sell-outs, 17 dual private 
sell-outs, and 5 dual public sellouts.    
Table I reports the means, medians, and standard deviations for the output and inputs of 
diversified firms from Compustat during the 2007-2014 time period. The sample includes 11,118 
firm-years that are used for calculating EOS for each Fama-French (1997) industry per year. Table 
II presents the means, medians, and standard deviations for the EOS measure by Fama-French 
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industry. The highest EOS industries are Shipping Containers, Defense, and Shipbuilding and 
Railroad Equipment, with mean values of 0.992, 0.988, and 0.980 respectively. The lowest EOS 
industries are Pharmaceutical Products, Petroleum and Natural Gas, and Precious Metals with 
mean values of 0.442, 0.535, and 0.565. Examining the standard deviations reveals some industr ies 
are more stable than others with respect to efficiency among diversified firms. The most stable 
industries are Shipping Containers, Defense, and Shipbuilding and Railroad Equipment while 
Electrical Equipment, Medical Equipment, and Pharmaceutical Products experience the most 
fluctuation in terms of efficiency.   
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RESULTS 
Table III provides summary statistics and univariate results for the IPO (Panel A) versus 
trade sale (Panel B) decision logit model. There are marked differences between both samples. 
The trade sale sample has greater annual sales and liquidity in their sellouts relative to the IPO 
sample. However, the IPO sample faces greater industry competition, have greater market-to-book 
ratios, and better time the market than the trade sale sample. The key independent variables of EOS 
and SMALL do not appear to be significantly different between the samples. Both the IPO and 
trade sale samples face similar efficiency by diversified firms in their industries and have similar 
proportions of firms with sales less than $50 million ($2009). I conduct multivariate setting to 
determine if the key variables are related to the exit decision.  
 Table IV reports the results for the IPO versus trade sale decision logit model. The first 
specification is the base while the second specification includes an interaction term between EOS 
and SMALL. The variables, EOS and SMALL are insignificant in both specifications. This implies 
that economies of scope nor having a small level of sales factors into a firm’s decision to either 
IPO or be acquired. As a result, I do not find evidence supporting hypothesis 1. However, the 
interaction of both, EOS*SMALL, is significant and negative in the second specification. This 
result implies that firms with sales less than $50 million ($2009) facing elevated levels of 
economies of scope for their industries are less likely to pursue an IPO. This finding is consistent 
with the economies of scope hypothesis of Gao et al. (2013). Consequently, I find support for 
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hypothesis 2; small private firms in industries with large economies of scope are more likely to 
exit via trade sale. 
 I test if small firm IPOs in industries with large economies of scope underperform on three-
year buy-and-hold basis and present the results in Table V.  I subdivide the sample into firms 
between Small and Large company IPOs (based on whether the pre-IPO last twelve months sales 
are less than or greater than $50 million) and tertiles based upon the IPO’s EOS for their industry. 
Interestingly, the sample of 270 Small IPOs have outperformed the market by 7.19% over this 
period while the sample of 356 Large IPOs have underperformed the market by 9.44%. Examining 
the results further reveals most of the Small IPOs return is driven mainly by the Small IPOs in the 
Bottom EOS Tertile. However, there is not sufficient evidence to confirm hypothesis 3. The only 
significant difference in returns occurs between the Small and Large sample of the Bottom EOS 
Tertile.     
Due to the impact of economies of scope on the exit decisions of private firms I examine 
how dual-track strategies may increase the premium on a sell-out. Table VI provides statistics for 
the means, medians, and standard deviation for the single and dual tracking samples. I present each 
strategy separately, but I combine the dual-track private sellout and dual-track public sellouts for 
the purposes of conducting univariate tests with the single-track sellouts sample due to the low 
number of observations. The single-track and dual-track samples are remarkably similar except 
for two independent variables. Single-track firms face great economies of scope and have less VC 
backing compared to dual-track firms. The difference in economies of scope runs counter to what 
was hypothesized, I conduct multivariate testing to determine if that is the case.    
 Table VII reports the results for the single-track versus dual-track decision logit model. 
The first specification is the base while the second specification includes an interactio n term 
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between EOS and SMALL. The variable, EOS, is significant and negative in both specifications. 
This implies that firms facing high levels of economies of scope in their industry are more likely 
to engage in a single-track strategy than to attempt a dual-track strategy. Consequently, I do not 
find any evidence to support hypothesis 4; Private firms in industries with large economies of 
scope have an increased propensity to adopt dual-tracking strategies. Instead I find evidence to 
support the exact opposite. This may imply on average firms do not see any value from decreasing 
asymmetric information to get a better valuation when confronted with high levels of economies 
of scope. Furthermore, both SMALL and the interaction term, EOS * SMALL, are insignificant, 
which implies smaller firms are not disproportionally affected.  
 In the final part of the analysis, I examine if elevated levels of economies of scope impact 
the premium received with either single-track or dual-track strategies. Table VIII reports the results 
for the cross-sectional regression of sell-out premium for the full sample. The variables, EOS, 
SMALL, and EOS*SMALL are insignificant in both specifications. This implies that economies of 
scope nor having a small level of sales factors into the sell-out premiums for either of these 
strategies. Furthermore, DUAL is insignificant in both specifications. This implies that the dual-
track strategy of either a private or public sell-out explain the premiums of the sample. Therefore, 
I do not find any evidence to support hypothesis 5; private firms in industries with large economies 
of scope receive a higher risk-adjusted payoff with a dual-track private sell-out than a single-track 
sell-out. Instead, I find that single-track and dual-track strategies are not different from one 
another. 
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CONCLUSION 
I directly test the economies of scope hypothesis of Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) using the 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology of Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013). Following their 
approach, I develop a metric for measuring economies of scope among diversified firms. I find 
support for the economies of scope hypothesis. Private firms with less than $50 million in sales are 
more likely to be acquired than to IPO when their industry has higher economies of scope. 
However, I do not find that economies of scope negatively impact 3-year buy-and-hold returns for 
IPOs. From an exit prospective, I find economies of scope are negatively related to firms adopting 
a dual tracking strategy, but does not explain sell-out premiums for acquired private firms. An 
extension of the time period to include regulatory changes, which include SOX and market rule 
changes would be a fruitful area for future research.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
EOSi,t Economies of scope measurement for industry i in year t. 
 
IPOd Equals 1 if firm i chooses an IPO and 0 if firm i chooses to be 
acquired via a trade sale. 
 
SMALL Equals 1 if the firm had $50 million ($2009) or less in total sales 
in year prior to exit strategy and 0 otherwise.  
 
HHI Herfindahl Index for the private firm’s industry. An IPO may be 
favored if the industry has high concentration because of antitrust 
concerns. A trade sale may be favored in a high concentration 
industry since intense competition may limit firm surviva l. 
(Audretsch 1995). 
 
PB Private Benefits is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs 
to either one of the following industry groups: two-digit SIC 
codes 13 (oil & gas production), 28 (chemicals and allied 
products), 29 (oil refining), and 37 (transportation equipment). 
Rajan and Wulf (2006) observe CEO and CEO-Divisiona l 
Manager perk consumption is highest in these industry groups. 
Bayar and Chemmanur (2011, 2012) predict founders and 
entrepreneurs are more likely to remain as higher management 
after an IPO while they are more likely to be released following 
a trade sale. Therefore, founders and entrepreneurs in these 
industry groups have an incentive for an IPO so they can retain 
their private benefits.  
 
IND_DA Industry mean (two-digit SIC grouping) leverage ratio calculated 
as total debt scaled by total assets. An IPO may be favored in a 
high leverage industry since firms have been scrutinized by 
lenders and therefore have lower investigation costs for the equity 
issue (Harris and Raviv 1990). On the other hand, high leverage 
may influence firms to adopt conservative restructuring.  
 
IND_TAN Average tangible assets / total assets ratio (net property and 
equipment scaled by total assets) for the firm’s two-digit SIC 
industry group. A firm with a higher tangible asset ratio should 
favor IPO since it will be easier for investors to value their 
underlying assets.    
 
IND_MTB Average market-to-book ratio for the private firm’s industry. The 
predicted relation is ambiguous since a higher market-to-book 
ratio provides incentives for higher valuations for both IPOs and 
trade sales.  
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HITECH Indicator variable equal to 1 for private firms in an high 
technology industry. The predicted relation is ambiguous since 
high tech firms receive higher investor attention (Maksimovic 
and Pichler 2001), but also receive relatively high premiums 
compared to other industries (Kohers and Kohers 2000).  
 
MKTRF Quarterly calendar market return minus three-month T-bill rate. 
 
MKTRFl Lagged quarterly calendar market return minus three-month T-
bill rate. 
 
HML Quarterly calendar return on a portfolio that is long on high book-
to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks. 
 
HMLl Lagged quarterly calendar return on a portfolio that is long on 
high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market 
stocks. 
 
SMB Quarterly calendar return on a portfolio that is long on small 
capitalization stocks and short on large capitalization stocks. 
 
SMBl Lagged quarterly calendar return on a portfolio that is long on 
small capitalization stocks and short on large capitaliza t ion 
stocks. 
 
RF Three-month T-bill rate. 
 
LIQUIDITY Percentage of the offer in cash for private targets and the ratio of 
secondary shares offered to total shares for IPO firms. Brau et al. 
(2003) predicts insiders with greater liquidity needs will select a 
trade sale since it usually provides greater liquidity than an IPO. 
 
TRACK Equals 1 if the firm uses a dual track exit strategy and 0 if the firm 
uses a single track exit strategy.  
 
PREMIUM The transaction value, or the amount paid for the sell-out firm, 
divided by the sell-out firm’s sale in the period prior to the 
takeover announcement. 
 
DUAL DUAL equals to 1 if the sell-out target is a private firm that filed 
for an IPO and later withdrew or if the sell-out target is a formerly 
private firm that completed an IPO and was acquired within a 
year of the IPO and 0 otherwise.  
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FOCUS Equal to 1 if the acquirer and sell-out target are from the same 4-
digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. Brau et al. (2010) find targets in 
the same industry as the buyer earn 7% greater in premiums. 
 
STOCK Equal to 1 for pure stock offers and 0 otherwise. Brau et al. (2003, 
2010) predict pure stock offers will have the highest premiums 
compared to all cash or mixed offers since the seller’s risk is 
highest.   
 
MIX Equal to 1 for takeovers paid with a mixture of stock and cash; 
and 0 otherwise. Brau et al. (2003, 2010) predict mixed offers will 
have higher premiums than all cash offers, but lower premiums 
than pure stock offers.    
 
ASSETS The natural logarithm of the sell-out firm’s total assets in the 
period prior to the acquisition. 
 
VC Equal to 1 if the firm is venture capital backed and 0 otherwise. 
VC backed firms historically receive higher premiums relative to 
non-VC backed firms. 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics for Diversified Firms 
Table I reports the means, medians, and standard deviations for the output and inputs of sample firms in Compustat 
during the 2007-2014 time period. The output and inputs are based on the methodology of Demerjian et al. (2012, 
2013). The output is Total Revenue of the firm (SALE). The inputs are 1) Cost of Goods Sold (COGS), 2) Selling , 
General & Administrative Expense (XSGA), 3) Net Property, Plant, & Equipment (PPENT), 4) Capitalized Operating 
Leases (MRC1, MRC2, MRC3, MRC4, and MRC5) which is calculated as the discounted present value of the n ext  
five years of required operating lease payments with a discount rate of 10%, 5) Capitalized Research & Development  
(XRD) which is calculated as 𝑅𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑝 = ∑ (1 + 0.2𝑡) × 𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑥𝑝
0
𝑡 =−4 , 6) Goodwill (GDWL) which is calculated as the 
premium paid over the fair value of a business acquisition, and 7) Other Intangibles (INTAN – GDWL) which reflects 
the other acquired and capitalized intangibles such as client lists, patent costs, and copyrights.  I follow Denis et al. 
(2002) by designating firms as specialized if they report as a single segment and diversified if they report more than 
one segment for that given year as reported in Compustat Segments. Dollar values are in millions (2014 purchasing 
power). 
 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Total Revenue 11,118 $7,303.76   $947.44 $25,638.36 
Cost of Goods Sold 11,118 $4,925.98 $581.47 $20,080.41 
Selling, General & Admin 11,118 $1,223.15 $161.87 $3,813.77 
Net Property, Plant & Equipment 11,118 $2,442.69 $181.97 $11,050.67 
Capitalized Operating Leases  11,118 $165.38 $23.27 $648.71 
Research & Development Expense 11,118 $654.36 $3.77 $2,832.16 
Goodwill 11,118 $1,163.83 $63.54 $4,648.25 
Other Intangibles 11,118 $683.18 $23.68 $3,906.62 
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Table II 
Summary Statistics 
Table II presents the means, medians, and standard deviations for the EOS measure by Fama-French industry for 
2007-2014. The output and inputs are based on the methodology of Demerjian  et al. (2012, 2013). The output is Total 
Revenue of the firm (SALE). The inputs are 1) Cost of Goods Sold (COGS), 2) Selling, General & Administrative 
Expense (XSGA), 3) Net Property, Plant, & Equipment (PPENT), 4) Capitalized Operating Leases (MRC1, MRC2 , 
MRC3, MRC4, and MRC5) which is calculated as the discounted present value of the next five years of required 
operating lease payments with a discount rate of 10%, 5) Capitalized Research & Development (XRD) which is 
calculated as 𝑅𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑝 = ∑ (1 + 0.2𝑡) × 𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑥𝑝
0
𝑡 =−4 , 6) Goodwill (GDWL) which is calculated as the premium paid over 
the fair value of a business acquisition, and 7) Other Intangibles (INTAN – GDWL) which reflects the other acquired 
and capitalized intangibles such as client lists, patent costs, and copyrights. I follow Denis et al. (2002) by designating 
firms as diversified if they report more than one segment for that given year as reported in Compustat Segments. 
Dollar values are in millions. 
 
Industry No. of Firms Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Agriculture 72 0.869 0.887 0.085 
Food Products 248 0.869 0.890 0.050 
Candy & Soda 51 0.909 0.886 0.062 
Beer & Liquor 35 0.927 0.935 0.049 
Tobacco Products  13 0.960 0.950 0.031 
Recreation 80 0.782 0.836 0.127 
Entertainment 186 0.580 0.580 0.110 
Printing and Publishing 65 0.909 0.914 0.043 
Consumer Goods 193 0.869 0.864 0.040 
Apparel 159 0.915 0.898 0.039 
Healthcare 198 0.881 0.904 0.063 
Medical Equipment 425 0.679 0.685 0.159 
Pharmaceutical Products  866 0.442 0.440 0.156 
Chemicals 306 0.925 0.933 0.046 
Rubber and Plastic Products  84 0.912 0.970 0.136 
Textiles 39 0.964 0.963 0.020 
Construction Materials  253 0.927 0.928 0.051 
Construction 140 0.816 0.819 0.086 
Steel Works Etc. 165 0.898 0.915 0.047 
Fabricated Products  30 0.977 0.980 0.019 
Machinery 478 0.875 0.886 0.062 
Electrical Equipment 243 0.780 0.846 0.185 
Automobiles and Trucks 225 0.952 0.961 0.041 
Aircraft 88 0.953 0.944 0.029 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 35 0.980 0.978 0.014 
Defense 28 0.988 0.986 0.010 
Precious Metals 84 0.565 0.536 0.135 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 51 0.641 0.595 0.137 
Coal 18 0.880 0.892 0.118 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 517 0.535 0.468 0.143 
96 
 
(Table II continued) 
Communication 464 0.745 0.724 0.094 
Personal Services 172 0.845 0.861 0.057 
Business Services 1868 0.583 0.571 0.104 
Computers 472 0.752 0.779 0.086 
Electronic Equipment 761 0.790 0.827 0.097 
Measuring and Control Equipment 278 0.789 0.789 0.079 
Business Supplies 157 0.943 0.949 0.032 
Shipping Containers  37 0.992 0.994 0.009 
Transportation 282 0.854 0.852 0.054 
Wholesale 470 0.826 0.816 0.063 
Retail 568 0.878 0.871 0.046 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 214 0.831 0.845 0.090 
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Table III 
Summary Statistics and Univariates for IPO versus Trade Sale Decision 
Table III provides statistics for the means, medians, and standard deviation for the IPO versus trade sale decision logit 
model. EOS is the economies of scope measurement for industry i in year t. SMALL equals 1 if the firm had $50 
million ($2009) or less in total sales in year prior to exit strategy and 0 otherwise. Sales is the dollar amount of total 
revenue in millions. LIQUIDITY is the percentage of the offer in cash for private targets and the ratio of secondary 
shares offered to total shares for IPO firms. HHI is the Herfindahl Index for the private firm’s industry. PB is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to either one of the following industry groups: two-digit SIC codes 13 (oil & 
gas production), 28 (chemicals and allied products), 29 (oil refining), and 37 (transportation equipment). IND_DA is 
the industry mean leverage ratio calculated as total debt scaled by total assets. IND_TAN is the average tangible assets 
/ total assets ratio (net property and equipment scaled by total assets) for the firm’s industry group. IND_MTB is the 
average market-to-book ratio for the private firm’s industry. HITECH is the indicator variable equal to 1 for private 
firms in a high technology industry. MKTRF is the quarterly calendar market return minus three-month T-bill rate. 
MKTRFl is the lagged quarterly calendar market return minus three-month T-bill rate. HML is the quarterly calendar 
return on a portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks. HMLl is the 
lagged quarterly calendar return on a portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks. SMB is the quarterly calendar return on a portfolio that is long on small capitalization stocks and short 
on large capitalization stocks. SMBl is the lagged quarterly calendar return on a portfolio that is long on small 
capitalization stocks and short on large capitalization stocks. RF is the three-month T-bill rate. Industries are defined 
as Fama and French (1997) 48-industry dummies. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are noted as *, **, and 
*** respectively. 
 
Panel A: IPO Sample 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
EOS 626 0.6933 0.7150 0.1726 
SMALL 626 0.4313 0 0.4957 
SALES 626 711.66 68.27* 6183.43 
LIQUIDITY 626 0.1385*** 0*** 0.0467 
HHI 626 0.0517** 0.0486* 0.0260 
PB 626 0.2732 0 0.4459 
IND_DA 626 0.6889 0.3819 1.9374 
IND_TAN 626 0.1713 0.1161*** 0.1251 
IND_MTB 626 2.0332*** 1.9587*** 0.6189 
HITECH 626 0.0288 0.0000 0.1672 
MKTRF 626 0.0428*** 0.0474** 0.0566 
MKTRFl 626 0.0441*** 0.0475** 0.0545 
HML 626 -0.0053 -0.0043 0.0407 
HMLl 626 -0.0028* -0.0032* 0.0443 
SMB 626 -0.0005 -0.0035 0.0327 
SMBl 626 -0.0012* -0.0010 0.0331 
RF 626 0.0023* 0* 0.0045 
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(Table III continued) 
Panel B: Trade Sale Sample 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
EOS 388 0.6931 0.7150 0.1919 
SMALL 388 0.4046 0 0.4915 
SALES 388 598.27 79.319 4371.38 
LIQUIDITY 388 0.3647 0.0306 0.3493 
HHI 388 0.0566 0.0496 0.0376 
PB 388 0.2526 0 0.4351 
IND_DA 388 0.6296 0.3989 2.3648 
IND_TAN 388 0.1797 0.1215 0.1243 
IND_MTB 388 1.8614 1.8543 0.5814 
HITECH 388 0.0361 0 0.1867 
MKTRF 388 0.0266 0.0402 0.0773 
MKTRFl 388 0.0275 0.0452 0.0812 
HML 388 -0.0060 -0.0043 0.0473 
HMLl 388 -0.0083 -0.0065 0.0455 
SMB 388 0.0010 -0.0019 0.0346 
SMBl 388 0.0027 -0.0006 0.0348 
RF 388 0.0018 0.0001 0.0037 
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APPENDIX 5: LOGIT MODEL FOR IPO VERSUS TRADE SALE DECISION  
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Table IV 
Logit Model for IPO versus Trade Sale Decision 
Table IV reports the results for the IPO versus trade sale decision logit model. The dependent variable, IPOd, equals 
1 if firm i chooses an IPO and 0 if firm i chooses to be acquired via a trade sale . EOS is the economies of scope 
measurement for industry i in year t. SMALL equals 1 if the firm had $50 million ($2009) or less in total sales in year 
prior to exit strategy and 0 otherwise. LIQUIDITY is the percentage of the offer in cash for private targets and the 
ratio of secondary shares offered to total shares for IPO firms. HHI is the Herfindahl Index for the private firm’s  
industry. PB is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to either one of the following industry groups: two -
digit SIC codes 13 (oil & gas production), 28 (chemicals and allied products), 29 (oil refining), and 37 (transportation 
equipment). IND_DA is the industry mean leverage ratio calculated as total debt scaled by total assets. IND_TAN is 
the average tangible assets / total assets ratio (net property and equipment scaled by total assets) for the firm’s industry 
group. IND_MTB is the average market-to-book ratio for the private firm’s industry. HITECH is the indicator variable 
equal to 1 for private firms in the high technology industry. MKTRF is the quarterly calendar market return minus 
three-month T-bill rate. MKTRFl is the lagged quarterly calendar market return minus three-month T-bill rate. HML 
is the quarterly calendar return on a portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks. HMLl is the lagged quarterly calendar return on a portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks 
and short on low book-to-market stocks. SMB is the quarterly calendar return on a portfolio that is long on small 
capitalization stocks and short on large capitalization stocks. SMBl is the lagged quarterly calendar return on a portfolio 
that is long on small capitalization stocks and short on large capitalization stocks. RF is the three-month T-bill rate. 
Industries are defined as Fama and French (1997) 48-industry dummies. All regressions include calendar year 
dummies. 
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(Table IV continued) 
Variable (1) (2) 
EOS 2.590 6.691 
 0.86 1.62 
SMALL 0.154 -0.209 
 0.72 -0.69 
EOS*SMALL  -4.235 
  -2.17 
LIQUIDITY -19.841 -23.566 
 -5.25 -4.54 
HHI -33.738 -31.947 
 -3.34 -2.97 
PB -1.443 -1.468 
 -0.94 -0.89 
IND_DA -0.086 -0.119 
 -0.69 -0.85 
IND_TAN 15.466 19.549 
 3.06 2.91 
IND_MTB 2.447 3.176 
 1.78 1.91 
HITECH -1.514 -2.176 
 -0.96 -1.33 
MKTRF 3.776 4.075 
 0.4 0.43 
MKTRFl 12.145 15.893 
 1.23 1.53 
HML -23.223 -26.441 
 -1.79 -1.91 
HMLl 26.233 23.800 
 2.01 1.73 
SMB 18.038 15.919 
 1.14 0.97 
SMBl -11.307 -13.812 
 -0.68 -0.83 
RF -14.741 -37.915 
 -0.09 -0.23 
Intercept -0.675 -3.075 
 -0.23 -0.84 
Pseudo R2 0.9551 0.9597 
Observations 1,014 1,014 
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APPENDIX 6: 3-YEAR BUY-AND-HOLD RETURNS FOR IPOS BY SALES AND 
ECONOMIES OF SCOPE 
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Table V 
3-Year Buy-and-Hold Returns for IPOs by Sales and Economies of Scope 
Table V presents buy-and-hold returns for the sample of 626 IPOs from 2007-2014. Buy-and-hold returns are 
calculated from the first CRSP-reported closing price through the earlier of the third year anniversary of the IPO, the 
delisting date, or December 31, 2014. Small and large company IPOs are defined on the basis of whether the pre-IPO 
last twelve months sales are less  than or greater than $50 million ($2009). EOS is the economies of scope measurement 
for industry i in year t. Market-adjusted returns are the difference between Unadjusted Returns and the CRSP value-
weighted index returns. All returns include dividends and capital gains, including the index returns.  Significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are noted as *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
 
No. of 
IPOs 
Average 
First-Day 
Return 
Unadjusted 
Return 
Market-Adjusted 
Return 
Small 270 13.79% 29.72% 7.19% 
Large 356 19.34% 18.23% -9.44% 
 
    
Top EOS Tertile 61 15.07% 15.48% -14.09% 
Small 16 14.83% 12.92% -14.80% 
Large 45 15.16% 16.43% -13.82% 
 
    
Middle EOS Tertile 113 18.19% 15.18% -10.56% 
Small 38 11.71% -2.18% -22.26% 
Large 75 21.30% 23.50% -4.96% 
 
    
Bottom EOS Tertile 452 16.92% 26.15% 1.31% 
Small 216 14.06% 36.41% 13.87%* 
Large 236 19.51% 16.88% -10.05% 
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APPENDIX 7: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATES FOR SINGLE AND DUAL 
TRACKING SAMPLE 
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Table VI 
Summary Statistics and Univariates for Single and Dual Tracking Sample 
Table VI provides statistics for the means, medians, and standard deviation for the single and dual tracking samples. 
The single track acquisition sample consists of private firms that are acquired in a trade sale without filing for an IPO. 
The dual track private acquisition sample consists of private firms that are acquired in a trade sale, but withdrew their 
IPO filing. The dual track public acquisition sample consists of formerly private firms that completed an IPO, but 
were acquired within a year of the IPO. PREMIUM is the transaction value, or the amount paid for the sell-out firm, 
divided by the sell-out firm’s sale in the period prior to the takeover announcement. EOS is the economies of scope 
measurement for industry i in year t. SMALL equals 1 if the firm had $50 million ($2009) or less in total sales in year 
prior to exit strategy and 0 otherwise. FOCUS is equal to 1 if the acquirer and sell-out target are from the same 4-digit  
SIC code and 0 otherwise. STOCK is equal to 1 for pure stock offers and 0 otherwise. MIX is equal to 1 for takeovers 
paid with a mixture of stock and cash; and 0 otherwise. HITECH is the indicator variable equal to 1 for private firms  
in a high technology industry. ASSETS is the natural logarithm of the sell-out firm’s total assets in the period prior to 
the acquisition. VC is equal to 1 if the firm is venture capital backed and 0 otherwise. Differences of means and 
medians are tested between single track acquisitions and dual track acquisitions. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels are noted as *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
Panel A: Single Track Acquisitions  
 
N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
PREMIUM 188 401.93 1.6587 3578.83 
EOS 188 0.7601*** 0.7895** 0.1640 
SMALL 188 0.4415 0 0.4979 
FOCUS 188 0.1702 0 0.3768 
STOCK 188 0.0319 0 0.1762 
MIX 188 0.1170 0 0.3223 
HITECH 188 0.1064 0 0.3092 
ASSETS 188 4.4963 4.2736 2.0952 
VC 188 0.0745*** 0*** 0.2632 
     
Panel B: Dual Track Private Acquisitions 
 
N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
PREMIUM 17 68.26 0.7669 250.735 
EOS 17 0.6809 0.716 0.2097 
SMALL 17 0.4118 0 0.5073 
FOCUS 17 0.1176 0 0.3321 
STOCK 17 0.0588 0 0.2425 
MIX 17 0.1765 0 0.3930 
HITECH 17 0.0588 0 0.2425 
ASSETS 17 4.7062 4.2324 2.141 
VC 17 0.4706 0 0.5145 
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(Table VI continued) 
Panel C: Dual Track Public Acquisitions 
 
N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
PREMIUM 5 8.3356 7.3924 2.4058 
EOS 5 0.5488 0.5290 0.0651 
SMALL 5 0 0 0 
FOCUS 5 0.4000 0 0.5477 
STOCK 5 0 0 0 
MIX 5 0.2000 0 0.4472 
HITECH 5 0 0 0 
ASSETS 5 4.9378 4.9388 0.8485 
VC 5 0.2000 0 0.4472 
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APPENDIX 8: LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF TRACK DECISION 
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Table VII 
Logistic Regression of Track Decision 
This table reports the results for the single track versus dual track exit strategies. The dependent variable, TRACK, 
equals 1 if the firm uses a dual track exit strategy and 0 if the firm uses a single track exit strategy. A single track 
firm is a private firm that is acquired in a trade sale without filing for an IPO. A dual track firm is either a private 
firm that is acquired in a trade sale, but withdrew their IPO filing or formerly private firm that completed an IPO, 
but were acquired within a year of the IPO. EOS is the economies of scope measurement for industry i in year t. 
SMALL equals 1 if the firm had $50 million ($2009) or less in total sales in year prior to exit strategy and 0 
otherwise. HITECH is the indicator variable equal to 1 for private firms in a high technology industry. ASSETS is the 
natural logarithm of the sell-out firm’s total assets in the period prior to the acquisition. VC is equal to 1 if the firm is 
venture capital backed and 0 otherwise. All specifications include year dummies. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
EOS -3.155 -3.311 
 -1.97 -1.71 
SMALL -1.07 -1.357 
 -1.61 -0.66 
EOS*SMALL  0.429 
  0.14 
HITECH 0.125 0.144 
 0.11 0.13 
ASSETS -0.094 -0.092 
 -0.55 -0.53 
VC 2.017 2.024 
 3.47 3.47 
Intercept 0.752 0.837 
 
0.45 0.47 
Pseudo R2 0.1707 0.1709 
Observations 210 210 
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APPENDIX 9: CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION OF SELL-OUT PREMIUM 
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Table VIII 
Cross-Sectional Regression of Sell-Out Premium 
This table reports the results for the cross -sectional regression of sell-out premium for the sample. The dependent 
variable, PREMIUM, is the transaction value, or the amount paid for the sell-out firm, divided by the sell-out firm’s 
sale in the period prior to the takeover announcement. EOS is the economies of scope measurement for industry i in 
year t. SMALL equals 1 if the firm had $50 million ($2009) or less in total sales in year prior to exit strategy and 0 
otherwise. DUAL equals to 1 if the sell-out target is a private firm that filed for an IPO and later withdrew or if the 
sell-out target is a formerly private firm that completed an IPO and was acquired within a year of the IPO and 0 
otherwise. FOCUS is equal to 1 if the acquirer and sell-out target are from the same 4-digit SIC code and 0 
otherwise. STOCK is equal to 1 for pure stock offers and 0 otherwise. MIX is equal to 1 for takeovers paid with a 
mixture of stock and cash; and 0 otherwise. HITECH is the indicator variable equal to 1 for private firms in a high 
technology industry. ASSETS is the natural logarithm of the sell-out firm’s total assets in the period prior to the 
acquisition. VC is equal to 1 if the firm is venture capital backed and 0 otherwise. All specifications include industry 
and year dummies.  
 
Variable (1) (2) 
EOS 1998.327 927.448 
 1.03 0.4 
SMALL 999.007 -882.582 
 1.50 -0.39 
EOS*SMALL  2574.415 
  0.86 
DUAL -378.559 -413.571 
 -0.44 -0.48 
FOCUS -532.053 -580.671 
 -0.78 -0.84 
STOCK 1259.782 1424.196 
 0.87 0.97 
MIX 1776.978 1756.858 
 2.33 2.3 
HITECH -30.908 -52.6675 
 -0.03 -0.05 
ASSETS 65.115 76.5615 
 0.39 0.45 
VC 991.095 1047.986 
 1.15 1.21 
Intercept -2878.87 -2184.98 
 -1.51 -1.06 
R2 0.1130 0.165 
Observations 210 210 
 
 
112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 3: DO PIPOS DECREASE IPO UNCERTAINITY? 
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PART 3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, capital markets for private equity investments have undergone a significant 
transformation. Since 2009, both the number and total dollar amount of private placements has increased 
and is now considerably larger than both public debt and public equity offerings (Ivanov and Bauguess, 
2013 and Bauguess, Gullapalli, and Ivanov, 2015). More importantly, some private firms have utilized 
later stage rounds to obtain funding comparable to traditional initial public offerings (IPOs). For funding 
of greater than $40 million, both academics and practitioners have labeled this later stage financing as 
private IPOs (PIPOs) (Brown and Wiles, 2015; CB Insights, 2015; Zörgiebel, 2016). Interestingly, some 
firms that undergo PIPOs eventually do pursue IPOs. Despite this paradigm shift, no study has 
investigated the benefits of PIPOs for firms which eventually go public via an IPO. This paper fills this 
gap in the literature by examining whether PIPOs decrease information asymmetry when firms 
eventually go public.  
Theoretically, PIPOs can mitigate problems of adverse selection and moral hazard because 
private placements can signal undervaluation (Hertzel and Smith, 1993) and provide more effective 
monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 and Wruck, 1989). Consequently, firms with larger, more recent, 
and frequent PIPOs should experience less underpricing and post-IPO volatility. Using a sample of 1,002 
U.S. IPOs from 2005-2016, I find support for this argument: a percentage increase in the ratio of PIPO 
funding to market value of equity at IPO reduces the first-day return by 2.53%. This result implies firms 
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with larger PIPOs potentially reduce moral hazard and signal their true value prior to going public. 
However, I do not find support that larger PIPOs reduce post-IPO volatility.  
I also test if the length of time between a firm’s PIPO and IPO impacts the firm’s valuation when 
it goes public. Folta and Janney (2004) suggest firms with more recent private placements have less 
information asymmetry. Following a private placement, confidence in the signal decreases since 
business conditions and opportunities can change over time. Results indicate a negative relation between 
the length of time since a PIPO and first-day returns. Each additional year between the latest PIPO and 
IPO date is associated with an 8.66% increase in first-day returns.  
Folta and Janney (2004) also propose firms with more numerous private placements experience 
less information asymmetry. First, offerings to multiple sophisticated investors can indicate the firm can 
convey true valuation. Second, offerings to existing investors should provide a positive signal of either 
continued or increased confidence in the firm’s prospects. Consequently, I test if the number of PIPOs 
reduce uncertainty at IPO. Contrary to Folta and Janney, I find firms with more PIPOs experience greater 
underpricing. Each additional PIPO is related with a 2.79% increase in first-day returns. I do not find 
any association between the number of PIPOs with post-IPO volatility.  
This study provides a number of distinct contributions. First, it describes and provides 
information about the PIPOs market. To the best of my knowledge the PIPO market has not been 
thoroughly examined by any other academic study. Second, it provides evidence for how PIPOs can 
reduce information asymmetry in firms that eventually go public. This information can provide 
practitioners with strategic insights for lowering their firm’s cost of equity when they file for their IPO. 
Third, the results may benefit regulators in private placement rule making. Discussion concerning 
investor protection is routine among all private securities, especially in terms of equity investments.  
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The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II reviews the prior literature on privately 
placed equity. Section III develops the hypotheses relating PIPOs with information asymmetry as 
measured with underpricing and post-IPO volatility. Section IV outlines the methods used in the study. 
Section V describes the dataset. Section VI presents the results. Section VI summarizes the findings and 
concludes. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the growing use of PIPOs prior research has focused on the equity choice between private 
investment in public equity (PIPEs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Hertzel and Smith (1993) 
find firms will choose PIPEs over SEOs when management believes the firm is undervalued. They 
propose direct negotiation between private investors and management leads to the discovery of the firm’s 
true value. Dai (2007) explain PIPEs can serve as an additional round of venture capital for companies 
that went public too early. Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2010) find the choice of contracting terms for 
PIPEs varies widely and is associated with issuer risk. Chen, Dai, and Schatzberg (2010) demonstrate 
stronger support that firms will choose PIPEs over SEOs when there is a high likelihood of 
undervaluation and where cost advantages exist.  
Folta and Janney (2004) investigate if PIPEs increase a firm’s longer-term competit ive 
advantage. Using a sample of biotech firms, they observe the occurrence of obtaining PIPEs increases a 
firm’s ability to gain financial capital, research partners, and commercial partners. Furthermore, they 
demonstrate the timing of PIPEs has positive long-term implications. Firms with more recent placements 
increase their ability to acquire financial capital and both research and commercial partners. In addition, 
firms issuing a greater number of private placements are more apt at acquiring financial capital. Overall, 
their results indicate PIPEs by certified investors help attenuate informational asymmetries by providing 
signals or enhancing monitoring.  
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Wu (2004) examines the choice between SEOs and PIPEs for high-technology post-IPO firms. 
She finds firms choosing PIPEs have higher information asymmetry than firms choosing IPO. She also 
finds evidence suggesting PIPE investors do not engage in more monitoring than SEO investors.  
 Rock (1986) develops a model to explain the underpricing of IPOs. In his model, informed 
investors have superior information about a new firm’s opportunities than either the firm or all other 
investors. Consequently, if new shares are priced appropriately then informed investors will crowd out 
other investors for good issues, but withdraw from the market on bad issues. The uninformed investors 
realize if they have access to a new issue then it must be a bad issue. Therefore, the firm offers their 
shares at a discount to guarantee full subscription of their issue. Consequently, firms with greater levels 
of information asymmetry experience greater underpricing and volatility (Ritter, 1984; Beatty and Ritter, 
1986; Lowry, Officer, Schwert, 2010).  
Theoretically, private placements can mitigate information asymmetry problems (Wruck, 1989; 
Hertzel and Smith, 1993). Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate if managers act in the interest of 
existing shareholders who are passive, then prospective investors, who are uninformed, will assume any 
equity issue means the firm is overvalued. Therefore, managers of undervalued firms with profitab le 
investment opportunities, but lacking financial slack will choose not to issue equity when the share of 
existing assets transferred to prospective stockholders exceeds the share of increased firm value retained 
by existing stockholders. Myers and Majluf suggest firms can alleviate underinvestment if managers 
disclose their private information during negotiations (e.g. merger discussions). Hertzel and Smith 
extend Myers and Majluf’s (1984) model to add private placements as a possible choice. They show 
private placements aid in solving the underinvestment problem. Firms experience a 1.7% increase in 
firm value after announcing the issuance of private placements.  
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Prior studies have investigated how blockholders can increase monitoring of management. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) demonstrate blockholders improve monitoring incentives. Furthermore, 
Wruck (1989) shows private placements can potentially provide more effective monitoring. Hertzel and 
Smith (1993) reason investment by private investors tied with management’s decision to bypass the 
public market signals that management believes the firm is undervalued. Consistent with benefits of 
increased monitoring, I expect firms with larger PIPOs will incur less underpricing and volatility than 
firms with less PIPOs. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms offering larger percentages of PIPOs relative to total equity experience less 
underpricing, ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms offering larger percentages of PIPOs relative to total equity experience less 
volatility post-IPO, ceteris paribus. 
Folta and Janney (2004) suggest firms should have less information asymmetry when a private 
equity placement is more recent. As time passes, confidence in the signal from the private equity 
placement PIPOs will decrease since business conditions and opportunities change. Thus, I expect 
firms with more recent placements incur less underpricing and volatility. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with more recent PIPOs experience less underpricing, ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 4: Firms with more recent PIPOs experience less volatility post-IPO, ceteris paribus. 
Finally, Folta and Janney (2004) indicate firms should have less information asymmetry when 
they have repeatedly offered private equity placements for two reasons. First, offerings to multiple 
sophisticated investors can indicate the firm is more apt at conveying its true valuation. Second, 
offerings to existing investors should provide a positive signal of either continued or increased 
confidence in the firm’s prospects along with effective managerial monitoring. Consequently, I expect 
firms with a greater number of PIPOs to incur less underpricing and volatility. 
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Hypothesis 5: Firms with more offerings of PIPOs experience less underpricing, ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 6: Firms with more offerings of PIPOs experience less volatility post-IPO, ceteris 
paribus. 
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METHODS 
This study follows the approach outlined in Loughran and McDonald (2013) for testing the 
effect of PIPO activity on first-day returns and volatility. The first dependent variable, First-Day 
Returns, is defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price. The second 
dependent variable, Post-IPO Return Volatility, is defined as the market model root-mean square error 
for each IPO over day +5 to day +64 relative to their IPO date. The value is multiplied by 1,000.   
The following independent variables test the hypotheses regarding PIPO activity for both 
dependent variables. PIPO is a dummy variable set to one if the firm issued a private IPO, else zero. 
PIPO% is defined as the percentage of the total dollar amount received in PIPOs relative to the market 
value of equity at the time of IPO. Both the PIPOs and market value of equity are converted to 2016 
dollars. Recent dummy is a dummy variable set to one if the firm issued a private IPO within the year 
prior to conducting their IPO, else zero. PIPO Count is defined at the number of private IPOs the firm 
issued prior to their IPO. 
In addition to the variables of interest, this study also uses control variables from the IPO 
literature that have been shown to explain first-day returns and post-IPO return volatility: 
Up Revision: The percentage upward revision from the mid-point of the filing range if the offer price is 
greater than the mid-point, otherwise zero. Loughran and Ritter (2002) propose that firms may increase 
the offer price to serve as a positive signal to potential investors. Bradley and Jordan (2002), Lowry 
and Schwert (2004), and Loughran and McDonald (2013) find a positive relation between up revision 
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of the offer price and first-day returns. Therefore, I expect a positive relation between up revision and 
the dependent variables.   
VC dummy: Dummy variable set to one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, otherwise zero. Bajo et 
al. (2016) argue Venture Capital (VC)-backed firms are typically younger, higher growth companies 
and are expected to have greater uncertainty on their valuation. I expect a positive relation between VC 
backed companies and the dependent variables.    
Top-tier dummy: Dummy variable set to one if the IPO’s lead underwriter has a value of eight or more 
using Carter and Manaster (1990) rankings as updated on Jay Ritter’s IPO website, otherwise zero. 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) observe a positive relation between underwriter rank and underpricing. 
They argue this relation is due to two factors. First, firms are placing a greater value on obtaining 
analyst coverage. Second, firms are willing to have greater underpricing due to the practice of 
investment bankers spinning shares to venture capitalists and executives at other firms that could 
potentially file for an IPO. Consequently, the larger underpricing in the spun shares influence decision 
makers at the potential firm to continue their relationship with the investment bank. Therefore, I expect 
a positive relation between lead underwriter rank and the dependent variables.    
Positive EPS dummy: Dummy variable set to one if the IPO has positive earnings per share (EPS) in 
the 12 months prior to going public, otherwise zero. Loughran and McDonald (2013) find a negative 
relation between positive trailing EPS and lower levels of post-IPO return volatility. Gao, Ritter, and 
Zhu (2013) observe a decrease in profitability among small IPO firms with 58% having negative EPS 
in 1980-2000 compared to 73% in 2001-2011. Consequently, profitability may serve as a robust signal 
in current IPO market. Therefore, I expect a negative relation between positive EPS and the dependent 
variables. 
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Prior Nasdaq 15-day returns: The buy-and-hold returns of the CRSP Nasdaq value-weighted index 
over the 15-trading days prior to the IPO date. Multiple IPO studies including Loughran and Ritter 
(2002), Hanley and Hoberg (2012), and Loughran and McDonald (2013) use prior Nasdaq returns to 
control for IPO hot markets. Consequently, I expect a positive relation between prior Nasdaq returns 
and the dependent variables.   
Share overhang: The number of shares retained divided by the number of shares in the initial offering. 
Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) argue managers strategically underprice IPOs to generate 
information momentum by attracting attention to the stock and thereby maximizing their own wealth 
when the lockup period ends. Ofer and Richardson (2003) explain if the public float is small relative to 
the shares retained by insiders then the market price will be higher due to a negatively sloped demand 
for shares. Consequently, I expect a positive relation between share overhang and the dependent 
variables.   
Sales: The natural log of trailing firm annual sales in millions of dollars. Loughran and McDonald 
(2013) find a negative relation between sales and lower levels of post-IPO return volatility. I expect a 
negative relation between sales and the dependent variables. 
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DATA 
The IPO sample includes 1,002 U.S. IPOs over 2005-2016 with an offer price of at least $5 per 
share, excluding ADRs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, natural resource limited partnerships, 
small best efforts offers, financial firms, and stocks not listed on CRSP. The IPO sample is obtained 
from Jay Ritter’s IPO website along with Thomson Financial Securities Data and SEC filings on 
EDGAR1. The PIPO sample includes 303 PIPOs from firms that eventually undergo an IPO. PIPOs are 
defined as equity financing of $40 million or more in growth rounds (Series B or later). Both PIPOs 
and total market equity at IPO are adjusted to 2016 dollars using inflation rates provided by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. The PIPO sample is obtained from CrunchBase Pro. The final sample includes 799 
traditional IPOs, firms that do not participate in PIPOs, and 203 firms that participate in PIPO activity.  
Table I presents summary statistics for the 303 PIPOs of firms that eventually undergo an IPO 
for the years 2000-2016. The number of PIPOs increase substantially starting in 2004 with 8 and peak 
prior to the financial crisis in 2007 with a total of 34. The average size of a PIPO is approximately 
$85.5 million while the median size is $59 million. There is also a wide distribution in the size of 
PIPOs among firms with the minimum at $40 million while the largest is $1,068 million. Due to the 
wide distribution of funding, PIPOs exhibit a standard deviation of $98.5 million over the sample 
period. 
Table II provides the summary statistics for the traditional IPO and the firms with PIPOs 
samples in Panel A and B respectively. There are marked differences between samples. The first-day 
                                                                 
1 I thank Jay Ritter for providing his IPO Data for this study. It can be found at https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-
data/ 
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returns (13.31% vs 24.62%) and post-IPO return volatility (3.47% vs 4.33%) are lower for the 
traditional IPO sample relative to the firms with PIPOs sample. Furthermore, firms with PIPOs 
compared to traditional IPOs have a greater percentage of VC-backing (97% vs. 44%) and 
underwriting by a prestigious investment bank (91% vs. 76%). However, PIPOs with IPOs are less 
profitable (48% vs. 17%) and generate less revenue prior to going public ($95.5 million vs. $734 
million) compared to other IPOs. I perform univariate analysis between the groups to confirm their 
differences.   
Table III reports the correlations between the variables used in the regression analysis. PIPO%, 
PIPO Clock, and PIPO Count have a negative association with First-Day Returns. Furthermore, PIPO 
Clock has a negative association with Post-IPO Return Volatility while PIPO Count has a positive 
relation. Other notable correlations with the PIPO related variables exist. All PIPO variables are highly 
positively linked to the VC dummy, but highly negatively correlated with the EPS dummy. There also 
is large positive correlation among the PIPO variables. Following Loughran and McDonald (2013), 
each PIPO variable has its own separate regression due to the high level of correlation among the PIPO 
variables.  
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RESULTS 
Univariate  
Table IV reports differences in means and medians for variables between traditional IPOs and 
firms with PIPOs. Univariate results show traditional IPOs have lower first-day returns and post-IPO 
return volatility than firms with PIPOs. PIPOs with IPOs have greater upward price revisions, higher 
amounts of venture capital backing, more prestigious lead underwriters at IPO, and greater amounts of 
share overhang. Moreover, traditional IPOs are more profitable and have a greater amount in sales than 
PIPOs with IPOs. These findings provide initial evidence against PIPOs decreasing information 
asymmetry in firms that eventually engage in an IPO. Instead, PIPOs may have the opposite effect.  
Investors may see PIPOs as a means for firms to exaggerate their valuations. Brown and Wiles (2015) 
find a quarter of their Unicorn2 sample have valuations at exactly $1 billion, which is highly unlikely 
to occur naturally.          
Mean first-day returns by year are reported in Table V. The percentage of firms with PIPOs 
increased in 2010 where they represent over 20% of total IPOs. In addition, mean first-day returns are 
significantly higher for firms with PIPOs than traditional IPOs in 5 of the 12 years. Overall, traditional 
IPOs average a mean first-day return of 13.31% compared to firms with PIPOs that average 24.62% 
and difference is statistically significant. Furthermore, this trend is more pronounced in recent years. 
Both years 2015 and 2016 observed a four-fold and three-fold difference, respectively, in underpricing 
between traditional IPOs and firms with PIPOs.  
                                                                 
2 A Unicorn is a private firm valued at more than $1 bil l ion 
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Table VI shows mean first-day returns by Fama-French industrial classification. Firms with 
PIPOs are present in 16 of the 42 industries. Pharmaceutical Products and Business Services have the 
greatest number of firms with PIPOs with 92 and 56, respectively. Mean first-day returns are 
significantly higher for firms with PIPOs compared to traditional IPOs in Healthcare, Pharmaceutical 
Products, Business Services, and Retail. Firms with PIPOs have a mean first-day return of 24.62% 
compared to 12.58% for traditional IPOs based on matching industries and is statistically significant. 
Multivariate 
Table VII presents underpricing regressions for measuring the effect of PIPO activity on first-
day returns of the IPO sample. The variable, PIPO, is positive and significant, which implies firms 
with PIPOs average a first day return 7.67% higher than those without PIPOs. PIPO% is negative and 
significant indicating that a percentage increase in the ratio of PIPO funding to market value of equity 
at IPO reduces the first-day return by 2.53%. This result supports hypothesis 1, firms offering larger 
percentages of PIPOs relative to total equity experience less underpricing. This finding is consistent 
with the benefits of increased monitoring as noted in Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Wruck (1989), and 
Hertzel and Smith (1993).  
PIPO Clock is positive and significant. This finding supports hypothesis 3, firms with more 
recent PIPOs experience less underpricing. Each additional year between the latest PIPO and IPO date 
is associated with a 8.66% increase in first-day returns, recent PIPOs have a stronger signal to the 
market, but as time passes confidence in the signal from the PIPOs deceases since business conditions 
and opportunities change. This finding is similar to Folta and Janney (2004) who find firms have less 
information asymmetry when a PIPE is more recent.  
The final PIPO variable, PIPO Count, is positive and significant. This result is inconsistent with 
hypothesis 5: firms with more PIPOs should experience less underpricing. I find each additional PIPO 
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is related to 2.79% increase in first-day returns. A possible explanation for this finding could be that 
additional PIPOs are a bad signal. Brown and Wiles (2015) report that 38 of 142 Unicorns have 
valuations of exactly $1 billion dollars. They hypothesize the valuations they receive may not reflect 
their true value, but rather are being to used to market themselves to potential employees and 
consumers. Consequently, the market may be aware of this and take that into account when valuing the 
firm’s IPO.               
 Table VIII reports regressions measuring the effect of PIPO activity on post-IPO return 
volatility of the IPO sample. Unlike the results with the first-day mean return, all PIPO variables are 
insignificant in explaining post-IPO volatility. These results indicate that hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 are 
unsupported. This may suggest PIPOs do not impact post-IPO volatility.  
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ROBUSTNESS 
 The probability of firms receiving PIPOs may be endogenous based upon firm-specific 
characteristics. The potential bias is addressed with propensity score matching where members of the 
treatment group, firms that participate in PIPOs, match with a member of the non-treatment group, 
firms that do not participate in PIPOs. Following Lee and Wahal (2004) and Hull (2013), this study 
matches firms using one-to-one nearest-neighbors propensity score matching with replacement. 
Caliendo and Kopeining (2005) suggest matching with replacement for small sample sizes to increase 
the average match quality and reduce bias. The first stage utilizes a probit regression where the 
dependent variable is equal to one for firms receiving PIPOs and zero for firms that did not receive 
PIPOs with the same independent variables as described earlier: Up Revision, VC dummy, Top Tier 
dummy, Positive EPS dummy, Prior NASDAQ 15-day returns, Share Overhang, and Log of Sales. The 
propensity score also uses IPO year and requires matches be in the same one-digit SIC code to ensure 
greater comparability. The second stage employs multivariate analysis on the matched sample of 
treatment and non-treatment members.  
Table IX reports the mean differences in first-day returns and post-IPO return volatility between 
firms that participate in PIPOs and propensity score matched firms that do not participate in PIPOs. The 
variable, PIPO, is positive and significant, which implies firms with PIPOs average a first day return 
5.44% higher than those without PIPOs. This implies with everything else being constant that having a 
PIPO increases IPO underpricing. The result for PIPO% are insignificant. These results do not support 
hypothesis 1 and 5. Therefore, based upon the matched underpricing regressions, do not demonstrate 
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blockholders improve monitoring incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Wruck, 1989) or decrease 
information asymmetry (Folta and Janney, 2004) with respect to firms that participate in PIPOs. 
Table X reports the mean differences in first-day returns and post-IPO return volatility between 
firms that participate in PIPOs and propensity score matched firms that do not participate in PIPOs. 
Similarly, to unmatched post-IPO return volatility regressions, all PIPO variables are insignificant. 
These results indicate that hypotheses 2 and 6 are unsupported. This provides more support that PIPO 
activities do not factor into the volatility of IPOs after their initial day of trading. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite the recent shift in public to private equity financing, no study has invested the benefits 
of PIPOs for firms, that eventually file for IPO. This paper finds that firms with PIPOs experience less 
underpricing when the percentage of PIPO investment is greater relative to total equity at IPO. A one 
percentage increase in the ratio of PIPO funding to market value of equity at IPO reduces the first-day 
return by 2.53%. This finding suggests there are benefits due to increased monitoring. I also find support 
that more recent PIPOs have less underpricing compared to earlier PIPOs. I find that each additiona l 
year between the last PIPO and the IPO date is associated with a 8.66% increase in first-day returns. This 
finding is consistent with the PIPO signal losing strength as business opportunities change over time.  
 I do not find support that the number of PIPOs decrease information asymmetry. I find each 
additional PIPO is related to 2.79% increase in first-day returns. A possible reason for this finding 
could be that firms that repeatedly go back for PIPOs send a bad signal to the market. 
 In matched sample results, undergoing a PIPO appears to increase IPO underpricing. Firms 
with PIPOs average a first day return 5.44% higher than those without PIPOs. This implies that having 
a PIPO is does not decrease information asymmetry. I do not find support that PIPO activity is related 
to post-IPO volatility. All results indicate that the market does not factor PIPOs into post-IPO 
volatility.   
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
First Day Returns Defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing 
price. 
 
Post IPO Return Volatility The market model root-mean square error for each IPO over day +5 
to day +64 relative to their IPO date. The value is multiplied by 1,000. 
 
PIPO Dummy variable set to one if the firm issued a private IPO, else zero.  
 
PIPO% Percentage of the total dollar amount received in PIPOs relative to the 
market value of equity at time of IPO (Both converted to 2016 
dollars). 
 
PIPO Clock The number of days between the most recent PIPO and IPO date 
divided by 365.25. 
 
PIPO Count The number of private IPOs the firm issued prior to their IPO.  
 
Up Revision Percentage upward revision in the offer price from the mid-point of 
the filing range if the offer price is greater than the mid-point, ((offer 
price - mid-point)/mid-point) x 100 if offer price > midpoint, else 
zero.   
 
VC dummy Dummy variable set to one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, 
else zero. 
 
Top Tier dummy Dummy variable set to one if the lead underwriter of the IPO has an 
updated Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of eight or more, else zero.  
 
Positive EPS dummy Dummy variable set to one if trailing EPS is positive at the time of 
the IPO, else zero. 
 
Prior Nasdaq 15-Day Returns The buy-and-hold returns of the CRSP Nasdaq value-weighted index 
on the 15-trading days prior to the IPO date, ending on day t-1.  
 
Share Overhang Defined as the number of shares retained divided by the number of 
shares in the initial offering. 
 
Sales Trailing annual firm sales in millions of dollars at the time of the IPO. 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics for PIPOs that Eventually IPO, 2000-2016 
The sample includes 303 private IPOs from firms that eventually undergo an IPO. Private IPOs are defined as equity financing 
of $40 million or more in growth rounds. Dollar figures are adjusted to 2016 dollars. The sample includes IPOs with an offer 
price of at least $5 per share, excluding ADRs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, natural resource limited partnerships, 
small best efforts offers, financial firms, and stocks not listed on CRSP. The private IPO sample is obtained from CrunchBase 
Pro. The IPO sample is obtained from Jay Ritter’s IPO website along with Thomson Financial Securities Data and SEC filings 
on EDGAR. 
  
Year No. of PIPOs Mean Size Median Size Min. Size Max. Size Std. Dev. 
2000 8 $59,629,566 $52,726,530 $41,626,210 $104,245,250 $20,629,693 
2001 7 $63,114,670 $51,705,880 $40,943,810 $136,018,030 $33,493,631 
2002 5 $50,035,824 $47,260,180 $40,261,032 $60,391,548 $9,138,152 
2003 5 $60,682,882 $65,677,910 $43,323,850 $72,758,530 $11,447,803 
2004 18 $74,875,388 $53,493,511 $40,791,050 $322,081,100 $65,523,340 
2005 13 $78,769,996 $62,032,890 $42,078,850 $245,857,430 $55,697,771 
2006 17 $132,573,571 $58,111,421 $42,836,630 $1,067,758,230 $244,447,827 
2007 34 $79,540,199 $59,478,885 $40,204,777 $277,327,410 $54,130,817 
2008 12 $88,865,931 $56,823,105 $40,824,369 $284,137,930 $72,355,084 
2009 27 $76,429,810 $63,614,040 $42,484,177 $225,789,320 $39,833,726 
2010 25 $85,409,978 $60,921,520 $43,130,234 $332,299,200 $66,754,482 
2011 23 $161,500,776 $74,738,199 $42,738,133 $1,041,491,564 $230,789,373 
2012 30 $69,656,526 $57,644,896 $40,571,670 $208,664,373 $36,148,649 
2013 25 $66,837,039 $50,643,710 $41,388,880 $173,117,260 $38,378,336 
2014 26 $91,895,749 $66,940,417 $40,869,941 $225,000,001 $48,764,515 
2015 27 $71,131,510 $65,952,556 $40,465,610 $202,341,625 $34,233,387 
2016 1 $53,195,020 $53,195,020 $53,195,020 $53,195,020 $0 
Total 303 $85,497,484 $59,052440 $40,204,777 $443,143,374 $98,551,855 
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Table II 
Summary Statistics for IPO Sample, 2005-2016 
The sample includes 1,002 U.S. IPOs with an offer price of at least $5 per share, excluding ADRs, unit offers, closed-end 
funds, REITs, natural resource limited partnerships, small best efforts offers, financial firms, and stocks not listed on CRSP. 
Panel A presents summary statistics for Traditional IPOs, IPOs that do not participate in private IPOs p rior to going public 
and Panel B presents summary statistics for IPOs that participate in private IPOs prior to going public. The sample is obtained 
from Jay Ritter’s IPO website along with Thomson Financial Securities Data and SEC filings on EDGAR. First-Day Returns 
is defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price. Post IPO Return Volatility is the market model 
root-mean square error for each IPO over day +5 to day +64 relative to their IPO date. The value is multiplied by 1,000. Up 
Revision is defined as the percentage upward revision in the offer price from the mid-point of the filing range if the offer 
price is greater than the mid-point, ((offer price - mid-point)/mid-point) x 100 if offer price > midpoint, else zero. VC dummy 
is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, else zero. Top Tier dummy is a dummy variable set to 
one if the lead underwriter of the IPO has an updated Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of eight or more, else zero.  Positive 
EPS dummy is a dummy variable set to one if trailing EPS is positive at the time of the IPO, else zero. Prior Nasdaq 15-Day 
Returns is defined as the buy-and-hold returns of the CRSP Nasdaq value-weighted index on the 15-trading days prior to the 
IPO date, ending on day t-1. Share Overhang is defined as the number of shares retained divided by the number of shares in 
the initial offering. Sales is defined as the trailing annual firm sales in millions of dollars at the time of the IPO. PIPO% is 
defined as the percentage of PIPOs relative to the market value of equity at time of IPO in 2016 dollars. PIPO Clock  is the 
number of days between the most recent PIPO and IPO date divided by 365.25. PIPO Count is defined as the number of 
private IPOs the firm issued prior to their IPO.  
Panel A: Summary Statistics – Traditional IPO sample, 2005-2016 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 5th Median 95th  
First Day Returns 13.31% 21.88% -10.00% 7.50% 58.40% 
Post IPO Return Volatility  3.47% 1.46% 1.63% 3.26% 5.85% 
Up Revision 4.50% 10.57% 0% 0% 18.78% 
VC dummy 0.44 0.50 0 0 1 
Top Tier dummy 0.76 0.43 0 0 1 
Positive EPS dummy 0.48 0.50 0 0 1 
Prior Nasdaq 15-Day Returns 0.88% 3.23% -4.52% 0.97% 6.02% 
Share Overhang 3.40 4.15 1.00 2.77 6.92 
Sales 734.0 5,588.9 0.1 80.5 2219.2 
Panel B: Summary Statistics – Firms with PIPOs sample, 2005-2016  
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 5th Median 95th  
First Day Returns 24.62% 35.41% -10.31% 13.33% 91.49% 
Post IPO Return Volatility  4.33% 1.89% 2.34% 4.08% 6.60% 
PIPO% 24.21% 22.42% 4.81% 17.26% 70.62% 
PIPO Clock 0.39 0.49 0 0 1 
PIPO Count 2.37 2.44 0.25 1.50 3.16 
Up Revision 5.61% 10.10% 0% 0% 19.9% 
VC dummy 0.97 0.18 1 1 1 
Top Tier dummy 0.91 0.28 0 1 1 
Positive EPS dummy 0.17 0.37 0 0 1 
Prior Nasdaq 15-Day Returns 0.97% 3.33% -4.60% 0.66% 6.10% 
Share Overhang 4.29 2.50 1.78 3.68 8.73 
Sales 95.5 297.9 0.1 24.7 308.6 
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Table III 
Correlations for the Full Sample of IPOs, 2005-2016 
The sample includes 1,002 U.S. IPOs with an offer price of at least $5 per share, excluding ADRs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, natural resource limited  
partnerships, small best efforts offers, financial firms, and stocks not listed on CRSP. The sample is obtained from Jay Ritter’s IPO website along with Thomson 
Financial Securities Data and SEC filings on EDGAR. First-Day Returns is defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price. Post-IPO 
Return Volatility is the market model root-mean square error for each IPO over day +5 to day +64 relative to their IPO date. The value is multiplied by 1,000.  
PIPO% is defined as the percentage of PIPOs relative to market value of equity at time of IPO in 2016 dollars. PIPO Clock  is the number of days between the most 
recent PIPO and IPO date divided by 365.25. PIPO Count is defined as the number of private IPOs the firm issued prior to their IPO. Up Revision is defined as the 
percentage upward revision in the offer price from the mid-point of the filing range if the offer price is greater than the mid-point, ((offer price - mid-point)/mid -
point) x 100 if offer price > midpoint, else zero. VC dummy is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, else zero. Top Tier dummy is a 
dummy variable set to one if the lead underwriter of the IPO has an updated Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of eight or more, else zero. Positive EPS dummy is a 
dummy variable set to one if trailing EPS is positive at the time of the IPO, else zero. Prior Nasdaq 15-Day Returns is defined as the buy-and-hold returns of the 
CRSP Nasdaq value-weighted index on the 15-trading days prior to the IPO date, ending on day t-1. Share Overhang is defined as the number of shares retained 
divided by the number of shares in the initial offering. Natural Log of Sales is defined as the natural log of trailing annual firm sales in millions of dollars at the 
time of the IPO. 
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Table III (continued) 
 
 
First 
Day 
Returns 
Post IPO 
Return 
Volatility 
PIPO% 
PIPO 
Clock 
PIPO 
Count 
Up 
Revision 
VC 
dummy 
Top Tier 
dummy 
Positive 
EPS 
dummy 
Prior 
Nasdaq 15 
day returns 
Share 
Overhang 
Log(Sales) 
First-Day 
Returns 
1.000 
           
Post-IPO Return 
Volatility 
0.131 1.000           
PIPO% -0.257 0.012 1.000          
PIPO Clock -0.069 -0.057 0.103 1.000         
PIPO Count -0.052 0.169 0.276 -0.182 1.000        
Up Revision 0.331 0.157 -0.258 0.065 -0.050 1.000       
VC dummy 0.051 0.109 0.073 -0.009 0.050 0.040 1.000      
Top Tier dummy 0.127 -0.011 -0.284 -0.158 0.086 -0.039 -0.059 1.000     
Positive EPS 
dummy 
-0.038 -0.037 -0.059 0.312 -0.047 0.114 -0.132 -0.046 1.000    
Prior Nasdaq 15-
Day Returns 
0.027 0.023 0.091 -0.011 0.006 -0.015 0.136 0.060 -0.085 1.000   
Share Overhang 0.255 0.059 -0.292 -0.117 0.228 0.135 -0.081 0.215 0.057 -0.028 1.000  
Log(sales) 0.112 -0.067 -0.184 0.250 0.149 0.172 -0.143 0.239 0.308 0.021 0.359 1.000 
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Table IV 
Differences of Means and Medians - Univariate Analysis 
Table V reports differences in means and medians of regression variables between Traditional IPOs and firms with 
PIPOs. First-Day Returns is defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price. Post-IPO 
Return Volatility is the market model root-mean square error for each IPO over day +5 to day +64 relative to their IPO 
date. The value is multiplied by 1,000. Up Revision is defined as the percentage upward revision in the offer price 
from the mid-point of the filing range if the offer price is greater than the mid-point, ((offer price - mid-point)/mid -
point) x 100 if offer price > midpoint, else zero. VC dummy is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO is backed by 
venture capital, else zero. Top Tier dummy is a dummy variable set to one if the lead underwriter of the IPO has an 
updated Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of eight or more, else zero. Positive EPS dummy is a dummy variable set to 
one if trailing EPS is positive at the time of the IPO, else zero. Prior Nasdaq 15-day Returns is defined as the buy-
and-hold returns of the CRSP Nasdaq value-weighted index on the 15-trading days prior to the IPO date, ending on 
day t-1. Share Overhang is defined as the number of shares retained divided by the number of shares in the initial 
offering. Natural Log of Sales is defined as the natural log of trailing annual firm sales in millions of dollars at the 
time of the IPO. 
  
Variable   Traditional IPOs Firms with PIPOs Difference p-value 
First-Day Returns 
Mean 13.31% 24.62% -11.31% <.001 
Median 7.50% 13.33% -5.83% <.001 
 
Post-IPO Return Volatility 
Mean 3.47% 4.33% -0.86 <.001 
Median 3.26% 4.08% -0.82 <.001 
 
Up Revision 
Mean 4.50% 5.61% -1.11 0.177 
Median 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.019 
 
VC dummy 
Mean 0.44 0.97 -0.53 <.001 
Median 0.00 1.00 -1.00 <.001 
 
Top Tier dummy  
Mean 0.76 0.91 -0.15 <.001 
Median 0.00 1.00 -1.00 <.001 
 
Positive EPS dummy 
Mean 0.48 0.17 0.31 <.001 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 <.001 
 
Prior Nasdaq 15-Day Returns 
Mean 0.88% 0.97% -0.09 0.745 
Median 0.97% 0.66% 0.31 0.974 
 
Share Overhang 
Mean 3.40 4.29 -0.89 0.004 
Median 2.77 3.68 -0.91 <.001 
 
Natural Log of Sales 
Mean 1.40 0.27 1.13 <.001 
Median 1.91 1.39 0.52 <.001 
Observations 799 203   
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Table V 
Mean First-day Returns by Year, 2005-2016 
The sample includes 1,002 U.S. IPOs with an offer price of at least $5 per share, excluding ADRs, unit offers, closed-
end funds, REITs, natural resource limited partnerships, small best efforts offers, financial firms, and stocks not listed 
on CRSP. Statistics are subdivided between Traditional IPOs, IPOs that do not participate in private IPOs prior to 
going public and IPOs that participate in private IPOs prior to going public. The sample is obtained from Jay Ritter’s  
IPO website along with Thomson Financial Securities Data and SEC filings on EDGAR. First Day Returns is defined 
as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
noted as *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
 Number of IPOs Mean First-Day Return  
Year 
Traditional 
IPOs 
Firms with 
PIPOs 
Traditional 
IPOs 
Firms with 
PIPOs 
Difference 
2005 108 5 10.49% 0.90% 9.59% 
2006 103 8 12.09% 13.57% -1.48% 
2007 96 19 16.80% 17.52% -0.72% 
2008 15 1 6.44% -1.67% 8.11% 
2009 33 4 7.14% 32.50% -25.36% 
2010 52 17 8.26% 7.41% 0.85% 
2011 44 15 13.59% 25.56% -11.97%* 
2012 58 14 22.40% 15.52% 6.88% 
2013 82 30 18.35% 33.29% -14.94%** 
2014 106 44 14.25% 27.54% -13.29%** 
2015 58 33 8.17% 32.21% -24.04%*** 
2016 44 13 11.31% 32.64% -21.33%** 
Total 799 203 13.31% 24.62% -11.31%*** 
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Table VI 
Mean First-day Returns by Fama and French Industrial Classification 
This table provides statistics for Fama and French Industrial Classifications in which firms with PIPOs participate in 
relative to Traditional IPOs. The sample includes U.S. IPOs with an offer price of at least $5 per share, excluding  
ADRs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, natural resource limited partnerships, small best efforts offers, financial 
firms, and stocks not listed on CRSP. Statistics are subdivided between Traditional IPOs, IPOs that do not participate 
in private IPOs prior to going public and IPOs that participate in private IPOs prior to going public. The sample is 
obtained from Jay Ritter’s IPO website along with Thomson Financial Securities Data and SEC filings on EDGAR. 
First Day Returns is defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price. Significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels are noted as *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
 Number of IPOs Mean First-day Return  
Industrial Classification 
Traditional 
IPOs 
Firms with 
PIPOs 
Traditional 
IPOs 
Firms with 
PIPOs 
Difference 
Healthcare 30 6 9.55% 33.29% -23.74%** 
Medical Equipment 52 10 11.87% 14.60% -2.73% 
Pharmaceutical Products  135 92 7.01% 20.02% -13.01%*** 
Chemicals 15 3 3.78% 4.91% -1.13% 
Construction 12 1 5.38% 47.38% -42.00% 
Electrical Equipment 5 1 11.03% 50.30% -39.27% 
Automobiles & Trucks 6 1 8.01% 41.06% -33.05% 
Petroleum & Natural Gas 17 2 4.96% 14.45% -9.49% 
Utilities 2 2 2.43% 16.24% -13.81% 
Communication 24 5 5.05% 1.96% 3.09% 
Business Services 201 56 17.86% 35.65% -17.79%*** 
Computers 18 9 23.40% 31.33% -7.93% 
Electronic Equipment 48 7 13.10% 19.05% -5.95% 
Measuring & Control Equipment 6 4 0.50% 7.64% -7.14% 
Wholesale 16 1 3.42% -2.27% 5.69% 
Retail 49 3 20.77% 48.66% -27.89%* 
Total 636 203 12.58% 24.62% -12.04%*** 
 
  
 151 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 8: UNDERPRICING REGRESSIONS 
 
  
 152 
 
Table VII 
Underpricing Regressions 
This table presents regressions for the sample of 1,002 U.S. IPOs with an offer price of at least $5 per share, excluding  
ADRs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, natural resource limited partnerships, small best efforts offers, financial 
firms, and stocks not listed on CRSP. The sample is obtained from Jay Ritter’s IPO website along with Thomson 
Financial Securities Data and SEC filings on EDGAR. The dependent variable, First-Day Returns, is defined as the 
percentage change from the offer price to the closing price. PIPO is a dummy variable set to one if the firm participates 
in a private IPO, else zero. PIPO% is defined as the percentage of PIPOs relative to market value of equity at time of 
IPO in 2016 dollars. PIPO Clock  is the number of days between the most recent PIPO and IPO date divided by 365.25.  
PIPO Count is defined as the number of private IPOs the firm issued prior to their IPO. Up Revision is defined as the 
percentage upward revision in the offer price from the mid-point of the filing range if the offer price is greater than 
the mid-point, ((offer price - mid-point)/mid-point) x 100 if offer price > midpoint, else zero. VC dummy is a dummy 
variable set to one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, else zero. Top Tier dummy is a dummy variable set to one 
if the lead underwriter of the IPO has an updated Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of eight or more, else zero.  Positive 
EPS dummy is a dummy variable set to one if trailing EPS is positive at the time of the IPO, else zero. Prior Nasdaq 
15-Day Returns is defined as the buy-and-hold returns of the CRSP Nasdaq value-weighted index on the 15-trading  
days prior to the IPO date, ending on day t-1. Share Overhang is defined as the number of shares retained divided by 
the number of shares in the initial offering. Natural Log of Sales is defined as the natural log of trailing annual firm 
sales in millions of dollars at the time of the IPO. All regressions include an intercept, Fama and French (1997) 48-
industry dummies, and calendar year dummies. The t-statistics are in parentheses with the standard errors clustered 
by year and industry.  
  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
PIPO  7.67    
  (4.48)    
PIPO%   -2.53   
   (-1.90)   
PIPO Clock    8.66  
    (1.97)  
PIPO Count     2.79 
     (3.02) 
Control Variables      
Up Revision 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.63 
 (2.36) (2.14) (2.36) (2.45) (2.39) 
VC dummy 10.15 8.14 10.29 9.34 8.97 
 (4.43) (3.24) (4.40) (3.36) (2.52) 
Top Tier dummy 4.21 2.96 4.29 3.31 3.53 
 (3.36) (9.73) (3.46) (2.42) (4.29) 
Positive EPS dummy 0.68 1.03 0.67 0.99 0.96 
 (1.55) (0.61) (0.44) (0.59) (0.59) 
Prior Nasdaq 15-Day Returns 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.48 
 (2.61) (2.87) (2.60) (2.76) (2.85) 
Share Overhang 0.61 0.57 0.62 0.56 0.58 
 (1.50) (1.47) (1.50) (1.47) (1.51) 
Natural Log of Sales -0.31 -0.24 -0.31 -0.15 -0.30 
 (-0.67) (-0.49) (-0.68) (-0.35) (-0.63) 
No. of observations 1,002 1,002 1,002 203 1,002 
Fama and French 48-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 23.33% 24.38% 23.34% 24.02% 23.77% 
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Table VIII 
Volatility Regressions 
This table presents regressions for the sample of 1,002 U.S. IPOs with an offer price of at least $5 per share, excluding  
ADRs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, natural resource limited partnerships, small best efforts offers, financial 
firms, and stocks not listed on CRSP. The sample is obtained from Jay Ritter’s IPO website along with Thomson 
Financial Securities Data and SEC filings on EDGAR. The dependent variable, Post-IPO Return Volatility, is the 
market model root-mean square error for each IPO over day +5 to day +64 relative to their IPO date. The value is 
multiplied by 1,000. PIPO is a dummy variable set to one if the firm participates in a private IPO, else zero. PIPO%  
is defined as the percentage of PIPOs relative to market value of equity at time of IPO in 2016 dollars. PIPO Clock  is 
the number of days between the most recent PIPO and IPO date divided by 365.25. PIPO Count is defined as the 
number of private IPOs the firm issued prior to their IPO. Up Revision is defined as the percentage upward revision 
in the offer price from the mid-point of the filing range if the offer price is greater than the mid-point, ((offer price - 
mid-point)/mid-point) x 100 if offer price > midpoint, else zero. VC dummy is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO 
is backed by venture capital, else zero. Top Tier dummy is a dummy variable set to one if the lead underwriter of the 
IPO has an updated Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of eight or more, else zero. Positive EPS dummy is a dummy 
variable set to one if trailing EPS is positive at the time of the IPO, else zero. Prior Nasdaq 15-Day Returns is defined 
as the buy-and-hold returns of the CRSP Nasdaq value-weighted index on the 15-trading days prior to the IPO date, 
ending on day t-1. Share Overhang is defined as the number of shares retained divided by the number of shares in the 
initial offering. Natural Log of Sales is defined as the natural log of trailing annual firm sales in millions of dollars at 
the time of the IPO. All regressions include an intercept, Fama and French (1997) 48-industry dummies, and calendar 
year dummies. The t-statistics are in parentheses with the standard errors clustered by year and industry.  
  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
PIPO  0.05    
  (0.22)    
PIPO%   -0.02   
   (-0.14)   
PIPO Clock    0.07  
    (0.21)  
PIPO Count     0.17 
     (0.70) 
Control Variables      
Up Revision 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (2.29) (2.32) (2.28) (2.36) (2.43) 
VC dummy 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.76 
 (4.55) (4.60) (4.78) (5.03) (5.24) 
Top Tier dummy -0.30 -0.31 -0.30 -0.31 -0.34 
 (-3.56) (-2.86) (-3.29) (-3.11) (-3.33) 
Positive EPS dummy -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 
 (-0.53) (-0.59) (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.42) 
Prior Nasdaq 15-Day Returns -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-2.18) (-2.11) (-2.19) (-2.19) (-2.03) 
Share Overhang 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (1.86) (1.88) (1.86) (1.92) (1.93) 
Natural Log of Sales -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
 (-3.37) (-3.53) (-3.37) (-3.60) (-3.39) 
No. of observations 1,002 1,002 1,002 203 1,002 
Fama and French 48-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 29.52% 29.53% 29.52% 29.53% 29.92% 
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Table IX 
Propensity Score Matched Underpricing Regressions 
This table presents regressions for the sample of 203 matched pairs of firms that participate in PIPOs and propensity 
score matched IPOs. The matching method uses one-to-one nearest-neighbors propensity score matching with 
replacement. The first stage utilizes a probit regression where the dependent variable is equal to one for firms receiving 
PIPOs and zero for firms that did not receive PIPOs with the same independent variables as described earlier: Up 
Revision, VC dummy, Top Tier dummy, Positive EPS dummy, Prior NASDAQ 15-day returns, Share Overhang, and 
Log of Sales. The propensity score also uses IPO year and requires matches be in the same one -digit SIC code to 
ensure greater comparability. The second stage employs multivariate analysis on the matched sample of treatment and 
non-treatment members. The dependent variable, First-Day Returns, is defined as the percentage change from the 
offer price to the closing price. Independent variables are defined as earlier. All regressions include an intercept, Fama 
and French (1997) 48-industry dummies, and calendar year dummies. The t-statistics are in parentheses with the 
standard errors clustered by year and industry.  
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (5) 
PIPO  5.44   
  (11.23)   
PIPO%   -5.80  
   (-1.10)  
PIPO Count    1.18 
    (1.42) 
Control Variables     
Up Revision 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.53 
 (1.60) (1.63) (1.53) (1.59) 
VC dummy 1.54 1.54 1.61 1.22 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.20) 
Top Tier dummy 10.02 10.24 9.48 10.04 
 (3.38) (3.44) (3.30) (3.46) 
Positive EPS dummy -6.87 -6.61 -6.86 -6.71 
 (-3.79) (-3.32) (-3.82) (-3.79) 
Prior Nasdaq 15-Day Returns 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.09) 
Share Overhang 2.52 2.42 2.52 2.45 
 (1.99) (2.10) (1.96) (2.02) 
Natural Log of Sales -0.70 -0.78 -0.66 -0.74 
 (-0.94) (-1.02) (-0.86) (-0.95) 
No. of observations 406 406 406 406 
Fama and French 48-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 22.71% 23.35% 22.83% 22.81% 
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Table X 
Propensity Score Matched Volatility Regressions 
This table presents regressions for the sample of 203 matched pairs of firms that participate in PIPOs and propensity 
score matched IPOs. The matching method uses one-to-one nearest-neighbors propensity score matching with 
replacement. The first stage utilizes a probit regression where the dependent variable is equal to one for firms receiving 
PIPOs and zero for firms that did not receive PIPOs with the same independent variables as described earlier: Up 
Revision, VC dummy, Top Tier dummy, Positive EPS dummy, Prior NASDAQ 15-day returns, Share Overhang, and 
Log of Sales. The propensity score also uses IPO year and requires matches be in the same one -digit SIC code to 
ensure greater comparability. The second stage employs multivariate analysis on the matched sample of treatment and 
non-treatment members. The dependent variable, Post-IPO Return Volatility, is the market model root-mean square 
error for each IPO over day +5 to day +64 relative to their IPO date. The value is multiplied by 1,000. Independent 
variables are defined as earlier. All regressions include an intercept, Fama and French (1997) 48-industry dummies , 
and calendar year dummies. The t-statistics are in parentheses with the standard errors clustered by year and industry.
  
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (5) 
PIPO  -0.10   
  (-0.32)   
PIPO%   -0.19  
   (-0.67)  
PIPO Count    0.02 
    (0.08) 
Control Variables     
Up Revision 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.77) (0.56) (0.62) (0.62) 
VC dummy 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.86 
 (1.99) (1.98) (1.98) (2.07) 
Top Tier dummy 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.12 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.34) (0.38) 
Positive EPS dummy -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
 (-0.16) (-0.18) (-0.16) (-0.17) 
Prior Nasdaq 15-Day Returns -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 (-2.09) (-2.03) (-2.08) (-2.02) 
Share Overhang 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (1.66) (1.81) (1.64) (2.00) 
Natural Log of Sales -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (-0.78) (-0.67) (-0.71) (-0.70) 
No. of observations 406 406 406 406 
Fama and French 48-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 29.63% 29.71% 29.67% 29.64% 
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